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DEATH: A NEW LEGAL PERSEPECTIVE
Sigrid Fry-Revere, Thomas Reher and Matthew Ray

1. INTRODUCTION

It is disturbing that so much of the debate surrounding the medical and
legal definition of death is driven by a need to preserve medical resources
and procure organs rather than by an honest scientific and philosophical
inquiry about the meaning of life and death.' This Article argues that the
focus should be on finding a precise definition of death and how to
determine it with certainty, not how to reduce medical costs and increase the
organ supply for transplantation. The issue usually debated by policymakers
and healthcare ethicists is not death, but rather whether society can find a
way to justify abandoning one set of dying patients to save another.2 A
liberal abandonment policy, however, entails ethically dangerous
consequences such as using people as merely a means to an end, violating
basic principles of informed consent, and disregarding patients' wishes
about end of life care. Further complicating the situation, these debates are
taking place in an atmosphere of public mistrust, and many of the policies
being implemented add to, rather than ease, the public's sense that it is being
deceived about the organ procurement process.
Keeping the public in the dark about the realities of how organ donation
affects end of life care is dishonest and manipulative, and such practices are
in part responsible for the growing public mistrust of the healthcare
profession in general and the organ procurement system in particular.4 With
proper education and fully-informed consent, more individuals would

1. Robert M. Veatch, The Evolution of Death and Dying Controversies, 39 THE
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 16, 18 (2009) ("Innumerable variations on the definition of death

incorporate philosophical and religious positions, many of which are not obviously
wrong.").
2. John A. Robertson, The Dead Donor Rule, 29 THE HASTINGS CTR. REP. 6, 6
(1999).
3.

R. D. Truog, Is It Time to Abandon Brain Death?, 27 THE HASTINGS CTR. REP.

29, 35 (1997).
4. Susan E. Morgan et al., In Their Own Words: The Reasons Why People Will
(Not) Sign an Organ Donor Card,23 HEALTH CoMM. 23, 25 (2008).
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choose to donate their organs than would otherwise do so without such
education, even if doing so meant abandoning preconceived notions of death
or proper end of life care. It is unknown whether this assessment is accurate,
but the current approach of encouraging donation without accurately
informing the public about how donation affects end of life care risks a
This
public backlash against the whole organ procurement process.'
unique;
Article's solution is untried in the context of organ donation, but not
it models the already well-developed legal approach for dealing with
similarly controversial decisions governing the refusal and withdrawal of
treatment.6
This Article lays bare what is at stake in the modem dispute over the
definition of death and argues that it is time to reconsider the legal definition
of death as it has developed over the last fifty years. Certainty should take
precedence over expediency, and individuals should be empowered to
include organ donation in their end of life care plans based on their own
personal beliefs. In short, as a matter of public policy, no patient should be
declared dead until after all integrated circulatory and brain functions have
ceased; but individuals should be allowed to decide for themselves, or
through their surrogates, whether to donate organs based on their own
concept of death and thus, if they so desire, before the official criteria for
determining death are met.
A general note for this Article: the common nomenclature of "brain
death" and "circulatory death" is confusing. The modifiers "brain" and
"circulatory" are generally used to indicate how death was determined, not
to indicate that only part of the person is dead.7 Yet, a central theme of this
Article is the discomfort many people feel with the exclusive use of either
neurological or circulatory criteria to determine death of the person as a

5. Considering the possible ramifications of closer consideration of declaring
patients dead by cardiac standards and transplanting their hearts into other patients as in
seen in Mark M. Boucek et al., Pediatric Heart Transplantation after Declaration of

709, 709-14 (2008),
Cardiocirculatory Death, 359 N. ENG. J. MED.
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMoa0800660; Arthur J. Matas et al., Morbidity
and Mortality After Living Kidney Donation, 1999-2001: Survey of United States
Transplant Centers, 3 AM. J. OF TRANSPLANTATION 830, 833 (2003).
6. See infra Part II; see generally Defining Death: Medical, Legal, and Ethical
Issues in the Determination ofDeath, PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, I (1981),

http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/past-commissions/definingfdeath.pdf
[hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N].
7.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 6, at 3.
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whole, and the use of such modifiers only contributes to the confusion
beleaguering the definition of death.
II. WHY THE DEFINITION OF DEATH BECAME AN ISSUE
In the not too distant past, the transition from life to death in the hospital
setting was more gradual, but also more definite than it is today. As hope
waned, so did the efforts to bring about recovery. 9 When medical
Only those with the most
interventions ceased, mourning began.' 0
of life. Eventually the
vigilantly
searched
for
signs
emotional investment
the
most hopeful could
became
grey
and
stiff
and
even
motionless patient
century,
however, dramatic
not deny that death had occurred." In the last
for a more
them
a
desire
advancements in medicine have brought with
death.12
of
precise definition
A. From Death of the Whole Organism to Death as Organ Failure
Black's Law Dictionary lists a pre-twelfth century definition of death that
is concise and hard to dispute: "The ending of life; the cessation of all vital
functions and signs."' 3 It is a definition that does not significantly differ
from that given by the President's Council on Bioethics in its 2008 white
paper on the definition of death, 14 which concludes in relevant part that

8. Id. at 21.
9.

Id

10.

Id

I1. Id. ("Until the past few decades, comatose patients fairly rapidly either improved
or died. If no other complication supervened and the patient did not improve, death
followed from starvation and dehydration within days; pneumonia, apnea, or effects of
the original disease typically brought on death even more quickly. Before such
techniques as intravenous hydration, nasogastric feeding, bladder catheterization and
respirators, no patient continued for long in deep coma.").
12.

Id.

13.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 458 (9th ed. 2009).

14.

THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, CONTROVERSIES IN THE

DETERMINATION OF DEATH: A WHITE PAPER BY THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS,

1, 1 (2008), http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/20091130_determination
death.pdf [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL].

of
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death is the absence of a "self-preserving commerce with the world."15
Compare these approaches to defining death of the whole organism to the
legal standards developed in the 1970s and 1980s that identify the loss of a
single function or organ with the determination of death. 16
Even as recently as 1968, death was legally defined as "[t]he cessation of
life; the ceasing to exist; defined by physicians as a total stoppage of the
circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital functions
consequent thereon, such as respiration, pulsation, etc."1 The definition
remains holistic, but also mentions the criteria used for determining death,
namely the cessation of vital functions.'
Since 1968, the definition of death has radically changed. Now, Black's
Law Dictionary still gives the pre-twelfth century definition, but also
provides a definition for brain death: "[t]he bodily condition of showing no
response to external stimuli, no spontaneous movements, no breathing, no
reflexes, and a flat reading (usually for a full day) on a machine that
measures the brain's electrical activity."l 9 With the advent of new medical
technologies, we have parsed "death" into subcategories, such as brain death
and cardiopulmonary death, which consequently has caused us to rethink
how to determine when an organism's life has ended. Where once "death"
sufficed as an all-encompassing term, now a collection of terms exist-for
brain death: whole or total brain death, total brain failure, coma depassee,
irreversible coma, brain arrest, and total brain infarction (death of tissue due
to lack of blood supply); and for circulatory death: heart death, heart/lung
death, cardiorespiratory death, and cardiopulmonary death.20
Unlike the definitions of the pre-1970s and the recent President's Council,
which considered death to be a holistic bodily event, the standards
developed from the 1970s to the 1990s targeted the cessation of specific
organ functions to justify removing the person from life support, or

15.

Id. at 62.

16.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 6, at 62 (summarizing KAN. STAT. ANN. §77-

202 (1971)).
17.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13.

18. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 6, at 5 ("Traditionally, the cessation of
heartbeat and of breathing were regarded by the lay and medical communities alike as the
definitive signs of death.").
19.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 13.

20.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 6, at 21.

Death: A New Legal Perspective

2010

5

procuring organs before they become unusable. 2 1 There is no doubt that the
process of death is a continuum from the failure of individual organs to total
system failure and then even to the breaking down of cellular processes. Yet
the issue is not the inevitability of the process (if it is clear that the patient is
in fact dying), but finding the point of no-return. The Nobel prize-winning
surgeon Joseph Murray knew he did not have to wait for a potential donor to
turn grey and stiff before harvesting the kidneys he needed for transplant,
and Murray's team received organs from patients that were declared dead
under the standard of the time, namely fifteen to twenty minutes after the
cessation of circulatory functions.22 Much has changed with how we
determine death (as evidenced by the methods described herein) since Dr.
Murray did his trail-blazing transplants, but one issue still remains: there is a
difference between dead beyond a reasonable doubt and the point at which
death becomes inevitable based on our knowledge of the statistical
likelihood of recovery. In dispute is which of these two sometimes quite
variable points in time should be used as the threshold for organ recovery.
The exact moment of death is elusive, but for legal reasons surgeons are
legitimately hesitant to take organs from patients who have not officially
23
been declared dead.
A tension exists between the need for certainty and
the need to procure organs early enough that they are still viable for
transplantation. These tensions are complicated by the fact that in the last
century medicine has improved dramatically in its ability to save lives

21. Stuart J Youngner & Robert M Arnold, Philosophical Debates About the
Definition of Death: Who Cares?, 26 J. OF MED. & PHIL. 527, 533 (2001),
http://www.psy.vanderbilt.edu/courses/honl82/whocares.pdf ("Brain death served two
useful purposes in 1968. First, it allowed physicians to turn off respirators without fear
of legal consequences . . . ."); "When the Harvard Committee put forward its new
"definition" of death in 1968, mechanical ventilators had just come into widespread use
but our society had no clinical, psychological, or legal experience with turning them off.
Physicians and hospitals were worried about the legal consequences of doing so." Id. at
534.
22. See generally, Thomas Brante & Margareta Hallberg, Brain or Heart? The
Controversy over the Concept of Death, 21 Soc. STUD. OF Sci. 389, 389-413 (1991)
(discussing the pre-transplant era, the standard for death was once considered to be
"when heart beat and breathing has stopped for about 15-20 minutes, death has occurred a

so-called

'heart

death."');

THOMAS

FLINT, JR.,

EMERGENCY TREATMENT AND

MANAGEMENT 334 (3d ed. 1964) (instructing that emergency personnel should continue
resuscitative efforts for an hour unless obviously futile (e.g. the person is decapitated) or
doing so will put the person providing emergency services in danger).
23.

See Youngner & Arnold, supra note 21.
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previously thought to be hopeless cases. 24 For example, before the ventilator
was invented in the 1900s, an inability to breathe meant death, and certain
classes of comatose patients were destined to die within days if not hours or
even minutes because the technology to sustain them did not exist.25
Medical advancements made it possible to hope for recovery in increasingly
unlikely situations and to parse the dying from the dead with ever greater
precision.26 The line between hope and despair easily becomes blurred for
patients' families and medical staff, particularly when giving up on one
patient may mean life for others. 27 Medicine and the law now find
Does society continue encouraging that
themselves at a cross-road:
everything be done to save every life, no matter how slight the chances of
recovery? Or is society ready to give up on certain classes of patients in
order to save others with a more realistic chance of survival? The issues of
1) how we define death and 2) who we determine should decide the point at
which we give up on one patient for the sake of others are critical to how
humanity sees itself and the future of medicine.
B. MedicalAdvances and the Costs ofPostponingDeath
Medical science has marched towards an ever-increasing ability to
postpone death.28 The advent of artificial ventilation around 190029 and
subsequent improvements in its design began to blur the line between life

24.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 6, at 21.

25.

Id. at 15-17.

26.

Id. at 17-18.

27.

Wayne Shelton, Respect for DonorAutonomy and the Dead DonorRule, 3 AM. J.

OF BIOETHIcs 20, 20 (2003).

28. Even the stethoscope fundamentally renovated the means for determining death.
It was one of the earliest technologies that could be used to look more closely at a body to
observe signs of life. The stethoscope was invented in France in 1816 by RendTh6ophile-Hyacinthe Laennec at the Necker-Enfants Malades Hospital in Paris. See
generally RENE-THEOPHILE-HYACINTHE LAENNEC,
TRAIT

DU

DIAGNOSTIC

DES

MALADIES

DES

DE L'AUSCULTATION MEDIATE OU
POUMON

ET

DU

COEUR:

FONDE

PRINCIPALEMENT SUR CE NOUVEAU MOYEN D'EXPLORATION (Brosson & Chaud6 1819).
29. L.A. Geddes, The History ofArtificial Respiration,26 INST. OF ELECTRICAL AND
ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS ENGINEERING IN MED. & BIOLOGY MAG. 38, 39 (2007); Michael

J. Cawley, Mechanical Ventilation: A Tutorialfor Pharmacists, 27 PHARMACOTHERAPY
250, 251 (2007).
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and death. The Iron Lung, widely used in the United States during the 1950s,
kept alive polio patients whose brains were still fully functional, but whose
bodies had otherwise forsaken them.30 Soon, however, ventilators were also
being used to keep patients alive who had lost brain function in the hope that
given time the brain would recover. ' The question arose of how to deal with
patients who had irreversibly lost their ability to interact with the world patients who were kept alive by machines that supported their circulatory
32
People
functions but did nothing to help them regain consciousness.
wondered whether keeping such patients alive by mechanical means was a
wise use of medical resources, whether it was undignified or cruel, and,
whether given the organ shortage, we should find a way to allow such
patients to become donors while their organs were still viable for
transplantation. 33
There was no organ shortage to speak of before the 1970s because organ
transplantation was in its infancy. In 1954, Dr. Joseph Murray successfully
transplanted a kidney from one identical twin brother into another.
However, not until more than two decades later did life-saving transplants
become a realistic option due to the development and improvement of
immunosuppressant drugs. 34 In particular, the discovery of cyclosporine in
1978 3 greatly increased the survival rate of transplant recipients and made
the expanded use of cadaver organs feasible. The procurement of cadaver

30. It is interesting to note the change in dynamics: patients using iron lungs or
ventilators to compensate for broken bodies were undoubtedly alive, and though their
lungs have failed, their hearts and brains remained intact. If there were a disease today
where muscular degeneration could progress to the heart and lung muscles but stop there,
would we put such a person on a heart/lung bypass machine or would we declare them
dead? James H. Maxwell, The Iron Lung: Halfvay Technology or Necessary Step?, 64
THE MILLBANK

Q.

3, 3 (1986).

31.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N,supra note 6, at 21-22.

32.

Id.

33.

There is no breathing without a central nervous system (CNS), but the heart can

beat without any signals at all from the CNS. See FREDERICK MARTINI & EDWIN
BARTHOLOMEW, ESSENTIALS OF ANATOMY AND PHYSIOLOGY 338 (1997) (discussing

heartbeat). See also id. at 424 (discussing the brain's role in breathing).
34.

Peter L. Abt et al., Donation After CardiacDeath in the US: History and Use,

203 J. AM. COLL. SURGEONS 208, 208 (2006).
35.

Id.
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organs, however, was complicated by the need to do so with limited delay.36
The longer the donor was dead, or rather the longer organs were without an
oxygenated blood supply, the less likely it was that retrieved organs would
be viable for transplant. As the science and practice of transplantation and
organ preservation techniques improved, the demand for organs surged.38
As the demand for organs increased, so did the push to clarify the definition
of death to allow for expeditious organ retrieval.
Laws developed to deal with three interrelated issues introduced by the
advent of new ventilation and transplantation technologies: 1) how to deal
with questions of human dignity and end of life choices in a pluralistic
society; 2) how to deal with futile treatment and prevent the wasting of
medical resources; and 3) how to maximize the supply of cadaver organs for
transplant. 39 The law took two distinct approaches to dealing with these
issues: 1) let patients decide for themselves at what point their life is no
longer worth preserving; and 2) clarify the point after which there is no
longer a social obligation to provide treatment and life-sustaining treatment
can be stopped and/or organs can be harvested. 40 The first approach has the
significant advantage that it helps preserve trust in the medical profession,
while in hindsight the latter approach seems to have had the opposite effect.
III. HOW THE LAW EVOLVED TO DEAL WITH END OF LIFE ISSUES

Conflicting interests are at the heart of all legal action. Recent practices
regarding end of life decisions raised several legal concerns. 4 1 Healthcare

36. Robert Steinbrook, Organ Donation after Cardiac Death, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED.
209, 210 (2007), http://content.nejm.org/cgi/reprint/357/3/209.pdf ("If a patient does not
die quickly enough to permit the recovery of organs, end-of-life care continues and any
planned donation is canceled. At present, this may happen in up to 20% of cases.").
37.

Id.

3 8. Id.
39.

In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 825 (1994);

UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (2009), available at http://www.anatomicalgiftact.org/

DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex= I &tabid=63.
40. See, e.g., Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
For law increasing patient self determination, see Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR.
REv. STAT. §§ 127.005 to 127.045 (2010); see infra notes 93, 97, and 98. For law
describing the end of duty to treat, see UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, supra note 39.

41.

See Boucek, supra note 5, at 709-14.
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costs were rising, and spending precious dollars on patients with no chance
of recovery seemed to be a waste of money.42 Some argued for a right to
life, others for a right to die. 43 Some argued that treatment was futile or that
certain groups of patients should be considered dead, while others argued
44
that such patients should not be abandoned.
Some urged that we find a
way to harvest more organs more efficiently, while others argued that it was
important to honor end of life wishes even if they interfered with organ
donation. The approaches described below involve two basic methods for
solving such conflicts. The first creates a legal obligation to treat but gives
patients and their proxies4 6 the right to refuse treatment and shields medical
professionals from liability if they heed such requests.4 7 The second
approach creates certain legal exceptions to the physician's obligation to
treat, and authorizes medical professionals to override the wishes of patients

42. U.S. Health Care Costs: Background Brief, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Mar. 2010),
http://www. kaiseredu.org/topics im.asp?imlD=1&parentlD=61&id=358. Some of the
data provided illustrates the staggering costs of health care spending in the United States,
which:
[I]n 2008, accounted for 16.2% of the nation's Gross Domestic Product; this is
among the highest of all industrialized countries. Total health care expenditures
grew at an annual rate of 4.4 percent .

. . ,

a slower rate than recent years, yet

still outpacing inflation and the growth in national income.
Id
43. See generally, Alexander M. Capron, At Law: Death and the Court, 27 HASTING
CTR. REP. 25, 25-29 (1997).
44.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 6, at 28.

45. D. Alan Shewmon et al., The Use of Anencephalic Infants as Organ Sources: A
Critique,261 JAMA 1773, 1775 (1989).
46. Like most courts, we will assume that when a patient's surrogate makes a
decision, he or she is not exercising substituted judgment, but acting as the patient's
agent, because the surrogate has unique knowledge as to what the patient would consider
in the patient's own best interest. The one exception is that the substituted judgment
standard is appropriate when the patient is a minor or an adult who never was competent
to make healthcare decisions. To avoid cumbersome language in the text, please
understand each reference to a patient's decision-making authority as implicitly including
his or her surrogate decision-maker, whether that person's authority comes directly from
the patient or by operation of law.
47.

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, H.R. 5835, 101st Cong. (1990).
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or their proxies under certain circumstances (futility and brain death)
without fear of liability. 48
A. First Approach: An Obligation to Treat and the Right to SelfDetermination

It is difficult to engender trust in a policy driven definition of death in a
pluralist society such as the United States, where cultural, religious, and
philosophical notions of life and death differ broadly. In a situation where
patients run the risk of being treated by medical professionals who do not
share their moral perspective, it is the government's obligation to protect its
citizens from both healthcare personnel who may disagree with a patient's
perspective and shifting societal norms that may violate a patient's religious
or moral beliefs. U.S. courts, and to some extent U.S. legislatures, realized
in the early 1900s that the only way to preserve both trust and the pluralist
49
nature of this country's moral fabric would be to establish a dual standard.
The government and medical profession would indiscriminately work to
preserve life, and patients would have the right to decide for themselves
when to change the goals of treatment or even stop treatment all together
based on their own personal assessment of the meaning of life and death.
There are some aberrant decisions, 50 but this dualist approach has been
affirmed and reaffirmed repeatedly at all levels of government.

48. See Bryan v. Rectors and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 95 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 1996)
(upholding the district court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss the claim brought
by Cindy Bryan, administratix of the estate of Shirley Robertson, to hold the University
of Virginia Medical Center liable for failing to provide stabilizing care as required by the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act).
49.

See discussionsupra Part III.

50. See generally Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072, 1072 (La. Ct.
App. 1998). The Louisiana Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that it was not a
battery when a physician and hospital withdrew life-sustaining care from a thirty-one
year-old quadriplegic comatose patient with end-stage renal failure over the express
objection of the patient's family. The patient's treating physician stipulated that with
continued ventilation and dialysis the patient could live another two years, but she would
only have a one to five percent chance of ever regaining consciousness. The court
acknowledged that questions of futility are subjective, but stressed that physicians have a
right to decide when treatment is medically inappropriate and held that this particular
case needed to be evaluated by a medical review panel under the state's Medical
Malpractice Act to see if the physician's (and hospital's) action was outside the standard
of care. Id.

2010
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The first prong of the dual standard - the medical profession's obligation
to do its best to preserve each patient's life regardless of personal feelings
about quality of life - helps engender trust in the profession but does nothing
to prevent what may seem like a waste of scarce and expensive life-saving
and life-preserving medical resources, and it does nothing to increase the
organ supply. The second prong however, allows individuals to choose for
themselves when to stop treatment that has little chance of improving their
quality of life. The obvious advantage of this approach is that patients
continue to trust healthcare professionals to do all they can to save a
patient's life until the point where the patient himself, or through an advance
directive or a proxy healthcare decision maker, requests that treatment be
altered or stopped.5 ' The locus of this trust lies in the assurance that
patients' decisions are respected, whether the decision is to continue, to
alter, or to stop treatment. The added benefit of personal decisions to forego
or withdraw treatment, is that fewer medical resources are spent on patients
with a hopelessly diminished quality of life, and more organs of higher
viability become available because the dying process, at least in some cases
(e.g., removal from the ventilator and/or artificial heart), is controlled
enough to allow for the careful timing of organ retrieval.
1. An Obligation to Treat

The physician's obligation to treat is deeply rooted in both medical and
legal tradition. 53 First, there is the historic concept of obligations afforded
by a physician's training. Second, there are the four principles dominating
contemporary medical ethics. 54 Finally, there are duties imposed by
professional associations and the legal system. 5

51.

See Susan D. Goold, Trust and the Ethics of Health Care Institutions, 31

HASTINGS CTR. REP. 26, 27-28 (2001).

52.

See Franklin G. Miller & Robert D. Truog, Rethinking the Ethics of Vital Organ

Donations,38 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 38, 45 (2008).
53. HIPPOCRATES, OF THE EPIDEMICS bk. I (Francis Adams trans., Internet Classics
Archive) (c. 400 B.C.E.), availableat http://classics.mit.edulHippocrates/epidemics. 1.i.
html.
54. TOM BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, PART
I99-287 (6th ed. 2009).

55.

Opinion 10.01: FundamentalElements ofthe Patient-PhysicianRelationship,

AM. MED. Ass'N. (1993), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/
medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinionl001.shtml.
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The origin of physicians' obligations to their patients is usually traced to
the Hippocratic school of medicine. Primarily, the maxim guiding
physicians is found in the phrase Primum non nocere, "above all, do no
This aphorism provides foundation for the principle of
harm."56
nonmaleficence, but the Hippocratic Oath itself provides a more express
obligation to treat: "I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick
according to my ability and judgment; I will keep them from harm and
injustice. "5 Thus, a fiduciary duty to help patients in whatever way a
physician's skills allow is evident even in some of the earliest tenants of the
medical profession.
In contemporary medical ethics, physicians' obligations to their patients
are fourfold: respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and
justice.5 Each of these provides an interrelated component of the doctorpatient relationship; in sum, they provide a framework for the proper
practice of medicine. Respect for the autonomous choices of patients
upholds the ability of the patient to make informed "choices, and to take
actions based on their personal values and beliefs.,"9 The "principle of
nonmaleficence imposes an obligation not to inflict harm on others." 60
61
While the extent to which this obligation should be followed is debatable,
56. HIPPOCRATES, supra note 53 (in which physicians agree "to abstain from doing
harm").
57. ANCIENT MEDICINE: SELECTED PAPERS OF LUDWIG EDELSTEIN 6 (Owsei Temkin
& C Lillian Temkin eds., 1967); see also BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 71 (Thomas Mappes &
David Degrazia eds., 2006).
58.

See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 54, at 12-13.

59. Id. at 103.
60.

Id. at 149.

61. Consider the case of the use of chemotherapy to inhibit the growth of and
ultimately kill a tumor: the administration of such drugs markedly harms (in the limited
sense) the patients. While the (intended) outcome of that specific course of action is in
the best interest of halting the growth of the tumor, the action itself denies the prima facie
obligation to "do no harm," because the drugs' effects on the patient's body are
devastating. It is, therefore, the requisite task of the medical team in conjunction with the
patient to deliberate over and decide upon in conjunction the best course of treatment for
a specific medical need, using the four principles as guideposts rather than hard-and-fast
rules. Louis LASAGNA, PHILOSOPHICAL MEDICAL ETHICs; ITs NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE

43-46 (Stuart Spicker & Hugo Englehardt, Jr. ed., D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1975)
(discussing "Do No Harm").
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the obligation accords with the traditional roles assigned to physicians. The
principle of beneficence requires that physicians provide a direct benefit to
their patients while simultaneously balancing the benefits and risks to
produce the best overall outcome. 62 Finally, the principle of justice requires
that "social benefits and social burdens be distributed in accordance with the
demands of justice."63 Justice details, at least in part, the means by which
resources that are paid for are allocated.64
U.S. physicians' obligations to their patients are grounded in adherence to
these principles as expressed through the codes of conduct advanced by their
governing professional associations. For example, the American Medical
Association (AMA), speaking to the duty the physician owes the patient,
states that:
The patient has the right to continuity of health care. The physician
has an obligation to cooperate in the coordination of medically
indicated care with other health care providers treating the patient.
The physician may not discontinue treatment of a patient as long as
further treatment is medically indicated, without giving the patient
sufficient opportunity to make alternative arrangements for care.
This duty of nonabandonment clearly is intended to foster trust.
The physician's obligation to treat was embodied in U.S. law through
several developments. Since 1937, the law has required that physicians,
after commencing treatment, continue treatment unless the physician gives
"the patient sufficient notice" to "procure other medical attention if he
desires."66 Furthermore, some courts have held that the locality rule (which
recognizes limitations imposed on rural physicians because of a lack of

62.

See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 54, at 197.

63.

BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 57, at 27.

64.

See generally NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY

(Cambridge University Press 2008). The "Just Health" conception proposed by Norman
Daniels is a theory that physicians should be concerned with the protection of the normal
range of opportunity, and disparities in health should be mitigated to protect the normal
range of opportunity afforded to the statistically "healthy" person. Id.
65.

AM. MED. Ass'N, CEJA REPORT A-90: FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF THE

PATIENT-PHYSICAN RELATIONSHIP 1 (1990), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama I/pub/upload/

mm/369/ceja aa90.pdf; see also Timothy E. Quill & Christine K. Cassel,
Nonabandonment: A Central Obligationfor Physicians, 122 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED.
368, 370 (1995).
66.

Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208, 211 (Utah 1937).
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specialized instrumentation or resources) does not relieve healthcare
professionals of the obligation to refer their patients to other specialized
providers when the first cannot or will not provide the required or requested
67
treatment.
Also, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) passed by
Congress in 1990, and modified in 2008, requires physicians (as individuals
operating services) to provide the disabled with the same opportunities
afforded to the non-disabled.
Lastly, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA) requires that hospitals with emergency medical facilities
examine all patients presenting to determine if an emergency exists, to either
provide stabilizing treatment or transfer the patient to another hospital, and
that specialty hospitals must accept cases requiring their specialty as
capacity allows.69 Specifically, the EMTALA calls for the following:
If any individual . . . comes to the emergency department and a

request is made on the individual's behalf for examination or
treatment for a medical condition, the hospital must provide for an
appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of
the hospital's emergency department, including ancillary services
routinely available to the emergency department, to determine
whether or not an emergency medical condition . . . exists. [If so,] the

hospital must provide either ... further medical examination and such
treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition, or ...
for transfer of the individual to another medical facility [and that] [a]
participating hospital that has specialized capabilities or facilities
(such as bum units, shock-trauma units, neonatal intensive care units,
... ) shall not refuse to accept an appropriate transfer of an individual
who requires such specialized capabilities or facilities if the hospital
70
has the capacity to treat the individual.
Together, the ADA and EMTALA can be understood as requiring
treatment for patients compromised by illness even if healthcare

67. See Jerald J. Director: Malpractice: Physician's Failure to Advise Patient to
Consult Specialist or One Qualified in a Method of Treatment Which Physician Is Not
Qualified to Give, 35 A.L.R.3d 349 (1971); see also Sylvia Law et al., Notes: The
Locality Rule and Quality of Care, L. & AM. HEALTH CARE Sys. 845-47 (West Group
Publishing 1999).

68. Americans with Disabilities Act Title III: Public Accommodations and Services
Operated by Private Entities, 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (1990).
69.

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1986).

70.

Id.
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professionals feel there is no long-term benefit to such treatment. For
example, in the case of In re Baby K, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided that emergency medical personnel could not refuse to provide
emergency treatment for an infant over the mother's objection, even if the
emergency team felt treating the anencephalic infant was futile and would
7'
only cause suffering and prolong the dying process.
2. The Right to Self-Determination
The obligation to treat is a derivative of the right to consent or refuse
treatment, not the other way around. Under common law, it was recognized
early on that obtaining consent in emergency situations was impractical.n
Often the patient was not well enough to give consent and, in emergency
situations, healthcare providers should concentrate on treatment, not getting
consent. As a result, it became public policy to assume consent in
emergency situations and protect healthcare providers from an accusation of
battery if they treated a patient under such circumstances without first
obtaining permission. 7 However, there were logical exceptions: What if the
patient or the patient's family was expressly and coherently objecting to
treatment despite the emergency? Or what if there was disagreement among
medical staff over the urgency of treatment and whether there was time to
obtain consent? The need for answers to these types of questions is what led
to the development of a whole body of law that deals with patient selfdetermination and the right to refuse or demand the withdrawal of even life74
saving or life-sustaining treatment.
a. Courts Uphold the Right to Refuse Treatment, Even Life-Saving
or Life-Sustaining Treatment
In the United States, where the law strives to respect the pluralistic
traditions of its citizenry, "dignity" and "quality of life" are concepts most

71. In re Baby K, 16 F.3d at 590; but see Bryan, 95 F.3d at 349 (discussing the
limited duty to treat potentially futile case, overcoming the emergency, and its immediate
aftermath).
72. See generally. Comm. on Pediatric Emergency Med., Consent for Emergency
Medical Services for Children and Adolescents, 111 PEDIATRICS 703, 703-706 (2003),
http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/pediatrics; 1 I1/3/703.pdf.
73. Kurt Hartman & Bryan Liang, Exceptions to Informed Consent in Emergency
Medicine, 35 HosP. PHYSICIAN 53, 56 (1999), http://www.turner-white.com/pdf/
hp mar99_emergmed.pdf.
74.

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, H.R. 5835, 101st Cong. (1990).
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likely applied to broaden, not narrow, patient self-determination. In 1914,
when the U.S. Supreme Court decided Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital, Justice Cardozo said, "Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body."75 Then in 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorariin In Re
Quinlan, sub nom Gargerv. New Jersey and thereby let stand a New Jersey
Supreme Court decision accepting the notion that the right to selfdetermination includes the right to have a surrogate decision-maker refuse
even life-saving or life-sustaining treatment for a patient who cannot
verbalize such a refusal on his or her own. 76 In In Re Quinlan, the New
Jersey Supreme Court wrote:
If a putative decision by Karen [the patient] to permit this noncognitive, vegetative existence to terminate by natural forces is
regarded as a valuable incident of her right of privacy, as we believe it
to be, then it should not be discarded solely on the basis that her
condition prevents her conscious exercise of the choice.77
Subsequently, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the
U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that there was a fundamental common
law and probably also a constitutional right to make one's own healthcare
decisions, including the right to refuse life-saving or life-sustaining
treatment, but that states had a countervailing right, derived from their
obligation to preserve life, to take appropriate measures to assure that there
is sufficient evidence of a patient's wishes before a surrogate may act to
The Court did not specify what
withdraw life-sustaining treatment.
standard of proof was required, only that it was acceptable for states to set
their own standards as to how much proof should be required. In this
particular instance, it was decided that Missouri's decision to use an
intermediate standard of proof, the "clear and convincing" standard, as
opposed to the lesser "preponderance of the evidence" or more stringent
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, was not an unconstitutional
restriction on a patient's right to due process. 79 Consequently, state laws in
effect today range from those that only require the surrogate to have some
evidence of the patient's wishes to those that specifically require a valid
75.

Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 126 (1914).

76. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 673, 684 (1976), cert. denied sub nom Garger v.
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
77.

Id. at 41.

78.

Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).

79.

Id.
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advance directive that clearly identifies which types of life-sustaining
treatment the patient would want to refuse and under what circumstances.so
b. Advance Directive Laws

While cases like In Re Quinlan were working their way through the
courts, many state legislatures, and eventually even the U.S. Congress,
considered advance directive legislation.8 ' Judicial decisions regarding
treatment refusal or withdrawal overwhelmingly focus on patients' rights,
82
In
but advance directive legislation often serves multiple purposes.
addition to affirming a patient's right to refuse treatment, these laws also
provided healthcare professionals with immunity from prosecution for
following advance directives, and legislators who have ethical qualms about
allowing the withdrawal of treatment were afforded an opportunity to
control the circumstances under which the right can be exercised.
In 1976, California passed the first advance directive legislation in the
country, the California Natural Death Act, which stated that "[t]he

80. For example, Nebraska law provides that an attorney may not remove patients
from artificially administered hydration and nutrition unless:
[T]he principal is suffering from a terminal condition or is in a persistent
vegetative state and the power of attorney for health care explicitly grants such
authority to the attorney in fact or the intent of the principal to have lifesustaining procedures or artificially administered nutrition or hydration
withheld or withdrawn under such circumstances is established by clear and
convincing evidence.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3418 (2010). Alternatively, South Dakota seems to utilizes the
"preponderance of evidence" standard, although not explicitly, for the making of
substituted judgment decisions. South Dakota's healthcare decisions by agent statute
states: "Whenever making any health care decision for the principal, the attorney-in-fact
or agent shall consider[] the decision that the principal would have made if the principal
then had decisional capacity, if known, and the decision that would be in the best interest
of the principal." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 59-7-2.5 (2008). At this point there are no states
that require the most stringent "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to permit a
healthcare proxy or advance directive to make decisions about the cessation of lifesustaining treatments, although arguably, some, like Nebraska and Alabama, seem to
apply a "clear and convincing" standard that is strict enough to almost qualify as "beyond
a reasonable doubt." ALA. CODE § 22-8A- 11 (2009).
81. See, e.g., California'sNatural Death Act, 128 W. J. MED. 322, 322-28 (1978),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1238103/pdf/westjmed00260-0066.pdf.
82.

Id. at 323.

83.

Id.
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terminally ill patient, in a prospective way, makes the decision," and that
"[t]hose most affected by the prospect of dying ought to determine how their
final days are to be spent." 8 The California legislation also specifically
protected healthcare providers who in good faith followed a "Living Will"
written under the Act. 8 But this legislation and the legislation passed by
other states since, limit the right of patients to direct end of life healthcare
decisions should they become incompetent. These limitations would not be
judicially acceptable for competent patients, but in the interest of protecting
potentially vulnerable incompetent patients the states have imposed various
restrictions. For example, the first version of California's advance directive
law was only available to patients suffering from a terminal condition, and to
be valid the Living Will could not be executed any earlier than two weeks
after the patient received a prognosis that death was imminent. Arkansas
followed with almost identical legislation in 1977. Most advance directive
laws today are not so restrictive regarding the declarant's prognosis at the
time the directive is executed, but they are often restrictive in other
respects. 88

84.

Id.

85.

Id.

86. Since 1976, the law in California has become less restrictive regarding who
qualifies for relief under the statute. Before the California Natural Death Act was
repealed and superseded by provisions of the California Probate Code, related to advance
health care directives, it provided the following definitions: "'Qualified patient' means a
patient diagnosed and certified in writing to be afflicted with a terminal condition by two
physicians, one of whom shall be the attending physician, who have personally examined
the patient," and "'Terminal condition' means an incurable condition caused by injury,
disease, or illness, which, regardless of the application of life-sustaining procedures,
would, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death, and where the application of
life-sustaining procedures, serve only to postpone the moment of death of the patient."
The Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-88 (repealed 1999) (The
Natural Death Act in California is superseded by the provisions of the California Probate
Code relating to advance healthcare directives.); see Bernard Lo & Robert Steinbrook,
ResuscitatingAdvance Directives, 164 ARCH. INTERN MED. 1501, 1502 (2004); see also
Med. Staff Conference, supra note 81.
87.

ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to 20-17-218 (2010).

88. E.g., restrictions on the use of artificial nutrition and hydration to non-invasive
forms without explicit request. Id. Many states, such as Colorado, include limitations of
application of advance directive to exclude pregnancy. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18101 to 15-18-113 (2009). Similarly, a few states also include restrictions of the power of
a proxy (restricting consent to abortion, sterilization, or psychosurgery). See D.C. CODE
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With time, various kinds of durable power of attorney (DPA) for
healthcare also became acceptable forms of advance directives. DPAs were a
pre-existing legal convention that became more common as a means of
appointing a proxy of one's choice instead of allowing a surrogate to be
89
Most states currently have incorporated
appointed by operation of law.
some form of DPA for health care, usually called a "healthcare proxy," into
their advance directive legislation, but even in those states where no special
healthcare power of attorney is available, the standard durable power of
attorney used in other contexts is an option. 90
In 1990, Congress passed The Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA)
with the intent of encouraging reliance on advance directives.91 The PSDA
requires that: (1) at the time of admission, patients be given a written
summary of healthcare decision-making rights specific to the state and the
facility's policies with respect to recognizing advance directives, (2) patients
be asked if they have an advance directive and that their response be
documented, (3) hospitals make an effort to educate staff and the community
about advance directives, and (4) no discrimination based on whether or not
a patient has an advance directive, and (5) providers educate themselves,
their staff, and the community on issues concerning advance directives. 92
3. PhysicianAid in Dying

Physician aid in dying tips the balance in favor of self-determination and
allows physicians to aid patients in ending their lives. The practice is legal
in Oregon, Washington, and Montana. 93 Physician aid in dying, or physician
assisted suicide as it is sometimes called, is clearly more than just a case of

§§ 7-621-30 (2009); see also Health-Care Decisions Act, D.C. CODE §§ 21-2201 to 212213 (2009).
89. Advance Directives, NAT'L CANCER INST. (Mar. 7, 2000), http://www.cancer.gov/
cancertopics/factsheet/support/advance-directives.
90. E.g., The Natural Death Act, ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to 22-8A-14 (2010); The
Health Care Decisions Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.52.010 to 13.52.395 (2010).
91.

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, H.R. 5835, 101st Cong. (1990).

92.

Id.

93. See Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.005 to 127.045
(2010); see also The Washington Death with Dignity Act, WASH REV. CODE §§
70.245.101 to 70.245.200 (2009), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?
cite=70.245; see also Baxter v. Mont., 224 P.3d 1211 (Mont. 2009).
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treatment refusal because patients are authorized to request lethal
medication, and physicians may assist by prescribing such medication
without fear of prosecution. 94 Some say aid in dying is a clear violation of
the obligation to treat. 95 Others argue that the obligation to treat includes the
obligation to treat terminal patients (or those whose self-assessed quality of
life falls below an acceptable threshold) by helping them through the dying
process, including helping them hasten death if that is what they wish.96 Aid
in dying is an undeniable example of how the law, at least in the
jurisdictions listed above, has found a way to preserve the general principle
that all medical professionals are obligated to preserve life while
simultaneously creating a safe harbor from liability for physicians who feel
caring for their patients includes respecting a terminally ill patient's wish to
end a life of pain and suffering or a life the patient no longer feels is worth
preserving. The legalization of "aid in dying" indicates that even an
extremely controversial practice can be accommodated without causing a
legal breach of the general medical obligation to treat. A vital distinction to
note is that "aid in dying" as practiced in Oregon and Washington State,97
unlike the active euthanasia practiced in countries like the Netherlands, has
effective safeguards in place to assure that the decision to end the patient's
life rests squarely with the patient and never with his or her physician. The
most significant safeguard is that patients must take the medication
themselves. No one can assist in the administration of the lethal dose. Thus,
these states allow individuals to make very controversial decisions for
themselves, while preserving trust in the medical profession by having
safeguards that protect the general public from even the perception that
healthcare professionals could take the initiative in ending a patient's life.98
94.

Id.

95. See generally Elliot N. Dorff, Assisted Suicide, 13 J.L. & RELIG. 263, 263-88
(1998).
96. F. M. Kamm, Ronald Dworkin on Abortion and Assisted Suicide, 5 J. ETHICS
221, 239-40 (2001).
97. Montana is not included because, as of this writing, the practice of "aid in dying"
is legal but not regulated. See Baxter v. Mont., 224 P.3d 1211, 1211 (Mont. 2009)
(holding that "physician aid in dying provided to terminally ill, mentally competent adult
patient, was not against public policy for purposes of exception to consent defense.").
98. The Oregon law provides the following basic safeguards: 1) the patient must be
an Oregon resident; 2) an adult of sound mind, demonstrated by a consultation with a
psychiatrist if needed; 3) have a terminal medical diagnosis (less than six months to live),
confirmed by a second physician; 4) make multiple requests, repeated by no less than
fifteen in a days' time, and one must be in writing witnessed by a non-relative of the
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4. Anatomical Gifts

Organ donation does not have a judicial history of preserving patient selfdetermination as is the situation for treatment refusal and withdrawal cases.99
Under English common law, the disposal of corpses and organ donation at
death was a matter of respecting the familial ri ht of burial, not a patient's
right to make end of life treatment decisions.'o It is only in the last halfcentury that decisions about organ donation have become more patientcentered and less about burial.10 ' This shift has created a situation in which
anatomical gifts are treated more like end of life care decisions than
decisions about the disposition of corpses. Thus, instructions regarding
anatomical gifts are now frequently included in, or along with, a patient's
advance directive, as if such decisions were end of life treatment decisions,
not wishes to be carried out after death.1 02
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), originally drafted in 1968
and revised in 1987 and 2006 sugests model legislative language for state
laws governing anatomical gifts.
In the Prefatory Note of the Revised
UAGA the National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) states that the Act "is promulgated . . . to address in part the
critical organ shortage by providing additional ways for making organ, eye,
and tissue donations."' 04 Furthermore, the most recent update of the UAGA

patient requesting the medication; 5) have a physician inform the patient of all potential
side-effects of the medication, including unintended effects and feasible alternatives; and
6) neither the physician, nor anyone other than the patient him/herself may administer the
medication. See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 127.005 to 127.045 (2010).
99. See generally Hudson v. Children's Hosp., 177 S.W. 3d 232 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005).
100. See Lott v. N.Y., 225 N.Y.S.2d 434 (N.Y. App. Div.1962) ("The law is well
settled that the surviving next of kin have a right to the immediate possession of a
decedent's body for preservation and burial and that damages will be awarded against
any person who unlawfully interferes with that right or improperly deals with the
decedent's body.").
101.

1962 marks the beginning of cadaveric kidney transplantation. Transplant

Network, HISTORY OF TRANSPLANTATION (Nov. 28, 2010), http://thetransplantnetwork.

com/faq/history-of-transplantation/.
102.

See CAL. PROB. CODE § 4701 (West 2010).

103.

UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, supra note 39.

104.

Id. The Prefatory Note goes on to state:
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adopts first person consent to specifically give physicians the authority to
follow a patient's wishes with respect to organ donation over a family's
objection. This most recent iteration protects physicians against civil suits
from patients' families for respecting a patient's wishes, over a family's
objection. The 1968 UAGA, which originally established the right to donate
organs, eyes and tissues was adopted by all states, 0 5 though the 1987
version was only adopted by twenty-six states, with others creating nonuniform anatomical gift acts.106 To date, forty-two states as well as the
District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands have enacted the 2006 version of
the UAGA, and two states are currently considering a bill to adopt the 2006
-- 107
revisions.
B. Second Approach: Limiting Quality ofLife Decisions

All of the developments in the courts and legislatures mentioned thus far
have dealt with the scope of an individual's authority to make decisions
regarding the care of his or her body during life and immediately following
death. But, there is another, less individualistic, approach to preventing the
waste of medical resources and increasing the organ supply. This second
approach, which was being pursued simultaneously with the first, focused its
efforts on redefining futility and death (as a matter of law and public policy)
in such a way that, in the most extreme cases, treatment could be stopped
without consideration for individual preferences.
Laws governing end of life decisions that focus on the obligation to treat
and patient self-determination always try to achieve what is best for the
patient, whether this includes preserving the patient's life at all costs, even
against his or her will, or allowing patients and their proxies to make life and

First, the [act] is designed to encourage the making of anatomical gifts. Second,
the [act] is designed to honor and respect the autonomy interest of individuals to
make or not to make an anatomical gift of their body or parts. Third, the [act]
preserves the current anatomical gift system founded upon altruism by requiring
a positive affirmation of an intent to make a gift and prohibiting the sale and
purchase of organs,
Id. at 2.
105.

Id.

106. See UNIFORM ANATOMICAL
archives/ulc/fnact99/uaga87.pdf.

GIFT ACT OF

1987, http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/

Enactment Status Map, NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
(Oct. 31, 2010), http://www.anatomicalgiftact.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex
=2&tabid=72.
107.

LAWS
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death decisions based on their own personal quality of life assessments. The
central issue in the obligation to treat / patient self-determination area of law
is always what is in the patient's interests, not cost containment or solving
the organ shortage. Some argued, however, that this patient oriented
approach was misguided and that more emphasis should be placed on the
good of society as a whole.108
The fierce battle waged over futility and the determination of death
fundamentally boils down to a debate over who will decide how to allocate
two types of life-sustaining medical resources for three types of patients:
emergency services for patients not likely to recover or live long, lifesustaining treatments for those suffering from significant permanent loss of
brain function, and life-saving organs for patients in need of an organ
transplant. 109
Allocation approaches aim to legally shift certain kinds of end of life
decisions away from patients and their proxies to the medical profession.110
One approach entails broadening the concept of medical futility to include
decisions not to treat patients with extremely poor prognoses. Another
approach includes redefining death so that hopeless cases can be declared
dead and removed from life support without the patient's, or the patient's
proxy's, consent. Most advocates of these approaches to cost containment
and increasing organ supply understand that they limit patient autonomy, but
argue that such limitations are .ustified in service of a greater good - that is,
to save money and save lives. l Few, however, seem to acknowledge that
these approaches could undermine public trust in the medical profession as a
whole and the organ procurement system in particular. 12

108. Sheri Fink, Advisory Subcommittee to CDC Approves Ethics Guidancefor
Rationing Ventilators, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.propublica.org/feature/
advisory-subcommittee-approves-ethics-guidance-rationing-ventilators-1 123.
109.

Focus on these issues has only intensified over the years. Id. at 1.

110.

Id.

Ill.

See Boucek, supra note 5, at 709-14; see also Truog, supra note 3, at 674-75.

112. But see Boucek, supra note 5. The report recognizes that certain members of the
transplant community and of the public at-large may object to reframing the
determination of death on the ethical principle of nonmaleficence because, as they state,
"if patients are not declared dead before organ procurement, then it seems there is no
choice but to conclude that the patients are being killed by their doctors." Robert D.
Truog, Role of Brain Death and the Dead-Donor Rule in the Ethics of Organ
Transplantation,31 CRITICAL CARE MED. 2391, 2395 (2003). This consideration brings

to light the fact that the public's understanding of the facts about determinations of death
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1. Expanding the Definition ofFutility

From the 1970s to the early 1990s, a movement developed to leave
determinations of "futility" to the medical community guided by the
heuristic of determining whether the patient had a chance of returning to a
meaningful quality of life. 1 13 The notion of "absolute" medical futility was
already a part of a legally recognized medical standard of care. Under the
"absolute medical futility" standard, usually just referred to as "medical
futility" but referred to here as "absolute medical futility" to distinguish it
from later, more subjective, interpretations of the phrase, physicians were
not expected to engage in procedures that had no chance of achieving the
immediate goals for which that procedure was intended.l14 But under the
newer, broader and more subjective, definition of futility, physicians were
allowed to consider not only the treatment's ability to meet immediate goals,
but also whether it would further longer term goals such as the recovery of
consciousness or discharge from the hospital.' 15 It would be absolutely
futile to perform resuscitative efforts on a corpse or to operate on the lungs
of a patient whose heart is failing because such procedures would not realize
their immediate intended medical goal of keeping the patient alive. A
physician who refused to perform such procedures under the given
circumstances would be excused from legal liability on the bases of absolute
medical futility regardless of whether the patient or patient's proxy felt such
procedures should be performed.
The logical leap some philosophers and physicians began suggesting to
courts and state legislatures in the '70s, '80s and early '90s, was that lifesustaining treatment for some patients is futile, not because the patient is
dead (that would be absolute medical futility), but because the patient's
chances of returning to a meaningful quality of life was too low to warrant
the expenditure of medical resources it would take to keep the patient

are confused, and thus may severely degrade the trust placed in the medical
transplantation system. Id.
113.

See Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072, 1075 (La. Ct. App. 1998).

114. Id. ("The physician has an obligation to present all medically acceptable
treatment options for the patient or her surrogate to consider and either choose or reject;
however, this does not compel a physician to provide interventions that in his view would
be harmful, without effect or 'medically inappropriate."').
115.

See Hudson v. Children's Hosp., 177 S.W. 3d 232, 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
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alive.'16 The problem with this approach is that the medical intent of lifesustaining treatment is to sustain life, without reference to its quality. Lifesustaining treatment is not medically futile, at least not in the traditional
absolute sense, if it realizes its goal of keeping the patient alive. Those
advocating an expansion of the concept of futility are trying to give
physicians authority to stop treatment on living patients based on so-called
"futility" for reasons of cost containment when traditionally such decisions
were reserved for patients and their proxies.
Understandably, this newer definition of futility causes confusion.1 7
Absolute medical futility details treatment options that will not achieve their
short-term goals, for example, restart the heart or keep the blood
circulating."
The newer, more subjective form of futility details those
aspects of treatment modalities that capture non-isolated medical issues
about a patient. 119 For example, treating a patient in persistent vegetative
state (PVS) for years, with no signs of higher brain function, may be
considered futile even from a medical standard of care perspective because,
based on current medical understanding of PVS, the patient is never going to
return to a meaningful quality of life. Resuscitation, if necessary, or the
provision of nutrition and hydration for such a patient would not be
medically futile in the absolute sense, but may be from a subjective
standpoint.
Traditionally, subjective forms of futility determinations were reserved for
patients and their proxies, but in a few instances, such determinations are
now left up to physicians under current law.120 Another important point
about having physicians make subjective futility decisions is that it is very
difficult in a pluralistic society to come up with a coherent medical standard
for determining what is, and what is not, a potentially meaningful quality of

116. See generally Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass'n, Medical
Futility in End-of-Life Care: Report of the Council of Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 281
JAMA 937 (1999).
117.

Id.

118.

Id.

119. Id at 938 ("Claims of medical futility inherently involve a value judgment. For
example, I patient may consider the physical, emotional, practical, or financial burden of
aggressive intervention not worth the purpose of prolonging seemingly meaningless
life.").
120. Causey v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 719 So. 2d 1072, 1072 (La. Ct. App. 1998);
TEX. STAT. ANN. § 166.052 (2003).
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life. 121 It is for these reasons that most courts still leave such decisions to
patients and their surrogates, and not to healthcare professionals.
There are two notable exceptions where the law seems to have agreed to
shift more subjective decisions regarding futility out of the realm of
individual choice and into the realm of medical standards of care established
by medical professionals.

In Causey v. St. Francis Medical Center, the

Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided that, under state law, a
medical panel, not the court, should decide whether a physician could
determine when to withdraw life-sustaining care. 122 Specifically, the
physician wanted to withdraw life-sustaining care from a thirty-one year-old
quadriplegic comatose patient with end-stage renal failure over the express
objection of the patient's family.123 The patient's treating physician
stipulated that with continued ventilation and dialysis the patient could live
another two years, but she would only have a one to five percent chance of
The court acknowledged that such
ever regaining consciousness.124
questions of futility are subjective, but stressed that physicians have a right
to decide when treatment is medically inappropriate and held that this
particular case needed to be evaluated by a medical review panel under the
state's Medical Malpractice Act to see if the physician's (and hospital's)
action was outside the standard of care.125 It is, thus, in this court's opinion,
the physician's prerogative to determine whether a proposed intervention
would be without medical effect or medically inappropriate. Furthermore,
the state court of appeals opined that, when the decision to abort treatment
because of medical futility is reached by a consensus of competent,
specialized physicians and affirmed by the ethics panel, the decision
becomes a standard practice of care that can be utilized as precedent. 126

12 1. Yitzchok A. Breitowitz, The Brain Death Controversy in Jewish Law, JEwiSH
bttp://www.jlaw.com/Articles/brain.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2010).

LAw ARTICLES,

122.

Causey, 719 So. 2d at 1075.

123.

Id.

124.

Id.

125.

Id.

126. Id. ("The physician has an obligation to present all medically acceptable
treatment options for the patient or her surrogate to consider and either choose or reject;
however, this does not compel a physician to provide interventions that in his view would
be harmful, without effect or 'medically inappropriate."').
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Another notable exception to patient self-determination is that portion of
the Texas Advance Directive Act that transfers decision-making authority
from individuals to the medical profession in certain circumstances. 127 The
"futility" section of the state statute allows physicians to stop life-sustaining
treatment on patients, even over a family's objection, after giving the family
ten days written notice to arrange to have the patient transferred to another
facility.128 Notably, this law does not take into consideration the patient's
personal preferences, but instead gives physicians (and their medical
institutions) the right to stop treatment in order to prevent the wasting of
scarce and expensive medical resources.129 The validity of the Texas statute
and the authority of medical professionals to unilaterally decide to stop
treatment in "futile" cases was affirmed by the Texas Court of Appeals in
Hudson v. Children's Hospital where a family was demanding treatment for
an infant with thanatophoric dysplasia and the patient's treating physicians
and the hospital (after giving the family the statutorily required time to
transfer the patient) discontinued life-sustaining treatment.130
2. Expanding the Definition of Death
Another notable shift away from patient-self determination is evident in
efforts to expand the definition of death. The NCCUSL, for example, made
no claims to any new philosophical insight or scientific discovery that lead
to its broadening the definition of death. 131 It was forthright in identifying
its motives, among which are listed:
1) The UDDA [(Uniform Determination of Death Act)] will help
assure the public that emergency equipment, such as respirators, will
be available in crisis situations for patients whose lives can be saved.

127.

TEX STAT. ANN.

128.

Id.

§ 166.052 (2003).

129. TEX. STAT. ANN. § 166.046(e) (2003). This law provides that a patient may
request continued life-sustaining treatment, despite the determination of the attending
physician that such treatment is inappropriate, and such treatment will be provided in
preparation for the patient's transfer to another facility. In such an event, the patient will
be responsible for any costs incurred in the transfer process. Id.
130.

Hudson v. Children's Hosp., 177 S.W. 3d 232, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

131.

Why States Should Adopt the Uniform DeterminationofDeath Act, NAT'L

CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/
uniformactwhy/uniformacts-why-udda.asp [hereinafter NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
COMM'RS] (last visited Nov. 28, 2010).
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2) A state's adoption of the UDDA aids the medical profession in
saving lives. Brain death determinations are important for organ
transplantation because, once death occurs, viable organs begin to
deteriorate. Brain death determinations make fresh organs more
available to those who need them.132
Arguably, however, the transplant community (as explained further
below) is trying to adopt a medical standard that construes death far more
broadly than what was originally intended by the UDDA or the 1980-1983
President's Commission. Both were deliberating the issue at the same time
the NCCUSL was considering replacing the Uniform Brain Death Act
(UBDA) with the UDDA.1 33 And both the NCCUSL and the President's
Commission advocated for a whole organism definition of death, not the
more recent position that circulatory criteria could be used as an alternative
to brain death even in situations where it is evident that brain death has not
134
occurred.

Efforts to redefine death began in the late 1960s and quickly
In 1968, the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical
proliferated.
School, which was created to examine the definition of brain death, first
drew serious attention to the option of creating a new legal definition of

132.

Id.

133. See Maxine Harrington, The Thin Flat Line: Redefining Who is Legally Dead in
Organ DonationAfter CardiacDeath, 86 DENv. U.L. REv. 335, 361 (2009).
134.

NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS, supra note 131.

The NCCUSL states "[An

attending physician often waits until a patient's heart fails to declare death even though
death has, in fact, already occurred." (i.e. brain death has already occurred). Id. See
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N supra note 6, at 58, (stating "[a]lthough absence of breathing and

heartbeat may often have been spoken of as "defining" death, review of history and of
current medical and popular understanding makes clear that these were merely evidence
for the disintegration of the organism as a whole."). See also Harrington,supra note 133.
Professor Harrington agrees with our conclusion, stating:
The President's Commission also looked upon death as a unitary phenomenon.
Consideration was given by the Commission to a statute that would contain
only a definition of brain death but circulatory death was included as alternative
criteria because 'the loss of spontaneous breathing and heartbeat are surrogates
for the loss of brain functions.'
Id.
135. For one such attempt, see generally Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical
School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, A Definition ofIrreversible Coma, 205
JAMA 337, 337-40 (1968).
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death.136
The Ad Hoc Committee determined that patients in an
"irreversible coma" should demonstrate unreceptivity and unresponsivity to
all stimuli, no movements or breathing, and no reflexes.' 37 Using different
criteria, Kansas, in 1970, was the first state to pass legislation defining brain
death.' 3 8 The Kansas law required that "based on ordinary standards of
medical practice, there is the absence of spontaneous brain functions."' 39 In
1972, Professor Capron and Dr. Kass proposed a substantially shorter
definition of death intended to overcome the "two deaths" problem by
making the two types of determinations mutually exclusive.140 Only when
"artificial means of support preclude" an ordinary determination of death
should brain death be considered.141 In 1975, the Law and Medicine

136.

Id.

137.

Id.

138.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 6, at 62 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN.

§77-202

(Supp. 1971).
139. Id. The Kansas statute, in relevant part, states:
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of a
physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence
of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function and, because of the disease or
condition which caused, directly or indirectly, these functions to cease, or
because of the passage of time since these functions ceased, attempts at
resuscitation are considered hopeless; and, in this event, death will have
occurred at the time these functions ceased; or a person will be considered
medically and legally dead if, in the opinion of a physician, based on ordinary
standards of medical practice, there is the absence of spontaneous brain
functions; and if based on ordinary standards of medical practice, during
reasonable attempts to either maintain or restore spontaneous circulatory or
respiratory function in the absence of aforesaid brain function, it appears that
further attempts at resuscitation or supportive maintenance won't succeed, death
will have occurred at the time when these conditions first coincide. Death is to
be pronounced before artificial means of supporting respiratory and circulatory
function are terminated and before any vital organ is removed for purposes of
transplantation. These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all
purposes in this state, including the trials of civil and criminal cases, any laws to
the contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
140.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 6, at 118.

141. Id. at 118 ("A person will be considered dead if in the announced opinion of a
physician, based on ordinary standards of medical practice, he has experienced an
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Committee of the American Bar Association (ABA) drafted a Model
Definition of Death Act that abandoned the cardiorespiratory determination
of death altogether and stated: "For all legal purposes, a human body, with
irreversible cessation of total brain function, according to usual and
42
In
customary standards of medical practice, shall be considered dead."
1978, the NCCUSL completed the UBDA based on the ABA suggestions.143
The AMA, not fully satisfied with the ABA model, created its own Model
Determination of Death statute in 1979.144 The AMA Model Determination
of Death statute offered legal protection to individuals who made end of life
decisions based on the statute. And then in 1980, the NCCUSL revisited the
issue, creating the Uniform Determination of Death Act, which, unlike the
UBDA, included circulatory criteria as an acceptable alternative to the use of
brain death criteria. 145
irreversible cessation of respiratory and circulatory functions, or . . . irreversible
cessation of total brain functions. Death will have occurred . . . when the relevant
functions ceased.").
142.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 6, at 117.

143.

UNIFORM BRAIN DEATH ACT, (1978). The Uniform Brain Death Act stipulates:

"For legal and medical purposes, an individual who has sustained irreversible cessation

of all functioning of the brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination under
this section must be made in accordance with reasonable medical standards." Id.
144.

UNIFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT (Aug. 1, 1980), available at

http://www.law. upenn.edulbll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1980s/udda80.htm (approved by the
American Medical Association on Oct. 19, 1980 and the American Bar Association on
Feb. 10, 1981). The Act states in relevant part:
An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory
and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the
entire brain, shall be considered dead. A determination of death shall be made
in accordance with accepted medical standards .

. .

. A Physician or any other

person authorized by law to determine death who makes such determination in
accordance with [the aforementioned] is not liable for damages in any civil
action or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for his acts or the
acts of others based on that determination. Any person who acts in good faith in
reliance on a determination of death is not liable for damages in any civil action
or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for his act . . . . If any

provision of this Act is held by a court to be invalid such invalidity shall not
affect the remaining provisions of the Act, and to this end the provisions of this
Act are hereby declared to be severable.
Id.
145.

Id. at 5.
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The NCCUSL understood that in most settings, circulatory death and
brain death are so closely linked that they are indistinguishable and that it
was impractical in most situations to require more than proof of cessation of
circulatory functions for a declaration of death.146 It is clear in hindsight that
the NCCUSL introduced brain function criteria specifically to allow the
removal of brain-dead patients from life-support and to allow the harvesting
of their organs, but did not anticipate (at least there is no indication in their
published discussions), that circulatory criteria might someday be used to
harvest organs even more expeditiously than brain criteria.147
The 1968 Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School, however,
foresaw problems with a dual-pronged approach.148 It clearly stated that
reliance on circulatory criteria "for the definition of death can lead to
controversy in obtaining organs for transplantation." 49 However, nowhere
in its discussion did the Ad Hoc Committee address the NCCUSL concern
that always requiring the use of brain death criteria would be impractical.
Also, Jerry Menikoff, the former director of the Office for Human Research
Protections, believes there is no doubt that the UDDA was meant to point to
Menikoff states, "cardiopulmonary
one death phenomenon, not two. 15
criteria were being retained [in the UDDA] precisely because they gave clear
results in the easy cases, where it was quite evident that brain function had
ceased . . .. ""'1 Finally, the President's Commission states, "the loss of
spontaneous breathing and heartbeat are surrogates for the loss of brain
function." 52
146.

Id.

147. Id. ("A state's adoption of the UDDA aids the medical profession in saving lives.
Brain death determinations are important for organ transplantation, because once death
occurs, viable organs begin to deteriorate. Brain death determinations make fresh organs
more available to those who need them.").
148. Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of
Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 JAMA 85, 85-88 (1968).
149. Id. ("The burden is great on patients who suffer permanent loss of intellect, on
their families, on the hospitals, and on those in need of hospital beds already occupied by
these comatose patients. Obsolete criteria for the definition of death can lead to
controversy in obtaining organs for transplantation.").
150. Jerry Menikoff, Doubts About Death: The Silence of the Institute of Medicine, J.
L., MED., & ETHICs 157, 160 (1999).
151.

Id. at 164.

152.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 6, at 37.
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Because the two sets of criteria for determining death are so closely
linked, we imagine that had the Ad Hoc Committee foreseen the current
controversy, it might have proffered something like the Institute of Medicine
(IOM) suggestion in its 1997 report, namely that non-heart-beating organ
donation is ethically acceptable as long as there is clear evidence of
irreversibility. 5 3 Although the Ad Hoc Committee would probably have
added that in questionable cases, there should also be a sufficient waiting
period after the end of circulatory functions to assure that brain death has
occurred.
Revisions to the holistic approach to the definition of death have been
controversial from the beginning, and over the years the debate has
intensified rather than cooled.154 Today, there still is no medical consensus
as to how much time after the cessation of circulatory functions brain death
occurs.15 5 Furthermore, several circumstances (e.g., immersion in cold

HERDMAN & JOHN T. PoTrs, NON-HEART-BEATING
153. ROGER
TRANSPLANTATION: MEDICAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES INPROCUREMENT (1997).
154.

ORGAN

PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL, supranote 14, at 1-2.

155. E-mail from James L. Bernat, Neurology Department, Dartmouth-Hitchcock
Medical Center to Thomas Reher, (Mar. 17, 2010) (on file with author). Dr. Bernat
postured that:
In most clinical settings in which the brain suffers anoxia (or hypoxia), it is
accompanied by ischemia (lack of blood flow). The typical situation occurs
during cardiopulmonary arrest when the brain is deprived of both blood flow
and oxygen. We call that circumstance "hypoxic-ischemic" neuronal injury.
When both occur together, it is hard to determine in retrospect how much
neuronal injury resulted from hypoxia and how much from ischemia.
We know that during normal brain metabolic conditions, consciousness is lost
after 10-20 seconds and irreversible neuronal damage begins after a few
minutes. During hypothermia or treatment with central nervous system
depressant medications that diminish neuronal metabolism - such as are used to
induce coma therapeutically after a brain injury - the brain can tolerate loss of
blood flow or oxygen for much longer periods because the neuronal metabolic
demands are lessened. But no one knows the minimum duration of circulatoryrespiratory arrest sufficient to produce "brain death" with destruction of
essentially all neurons. Most neurologists think that it takes at least 20-30
minutes of complete cessation of circulation and oxygenation, assuming normal
metabolic conditions.
The reason it is not known is there is no human model and studies on patients
during cardiopulmonary arrest are complicated by the fact that a resuscitation is
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water or similar sources of hypothermia, drug exposure, or metabolic or
endocrine disorders) can make conventional techniques for determining
death inaccurate.156 While one would expect the advancement of medicine
to provide more accurate means of determining death, the opposite seems to
be the case.
In recent years, both circulatory and brain criteria for
determining death have become more, rather than less, controversial. 5 7

IV.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL CRISIS

Every argument about the determination of death presumes the existence
of a perspective on what constitutes a human life worth saving. The UDDA
is vague on this point, perhaps intentionally so, but the fundamental
underlying metaphysical question has significant social and legal
ramifications that cannot be ignored.158
A. Balancing Respect for Persons and Maximizing HealthcareUtility

There is much debate over how to improve the U.S. healthcare system, but
there is little doubt that there is both a shortage of mechanical ventilators and
organs for transplantation.' 59 The ethos of always putting patients first has

underway with some degree of restoration of oxygenation and circulation, at

least temporarily.
Id.
156.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 6, at 154 ("There should be no suspicion that

this state is due to depressant drugs. Primary hypothermia as a cause of coma should
have been excluded. Metabolic and endocrine disturbances which can be responsible for
or can contribute to coma should have been excluded.").
157.

PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 1-2; see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N,

supra note 6, at 3.
158.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM'NS, supra note 131.

159. Douglas B. White et al., Who Should Receive Life Support During a Public
Health Emergency? Using Ethical Principlesto Improve Allocation Decisions, 150
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 132, 138 (2009); John L. Hick & Daniel T. O'Laughlin,

Concept of Operationsfor Triage of Mechanical Ventilation in an Epidemic, 13
ACADEMIC EMERG'Y MED., 223, 224 (2006), http://depts.washington.edu/respcare/

journal club/articles/20071022/Mech%20vent%20Triage%20in%2OEpidemic.pdf
(stating that if patients expected to improve have to compete with PVS or brain dead
patients without quality of life considerations, the shortage will worsen. The current
number of patients waiting for organs is well over 100,000); see generally UNITED
NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, www.unos.org (last visited Nov. 28, 2010).

The Journalof Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXVII: 1

34

been curtailed by notions of public responsibility and a need to balance the
interests of individual patients in need of expensive emergency care against
the needs of others.' 6 It is a difficult task to both show respect for the
individual patient and balance social pressures to maximize the overall
availability of health care. This ethical tension between respect for
individual persons and overall public health reflects the age-old conflict
between deontological and utilitarian approaches to ethics.
Deontology favors respecting patients as persons capable of making their
own decisions.161 The obligation of physicians under this perspective
requires that they think in terms of just the individual patient's best interest,
not how the individual patient's interests may be superseded by general
A deontological respect for persons is the
societal considerations.
justification for allowing advance directives to extend a person's autonomy
beyond his or her capacity to decide.162 Deontological thought places a
Court cases and statutes that allow
paramount value on self-governance.
individuals the freedom to make their own healthcare decisions, even if the
majority of the population believes such decisions are a mistake or against
the public interest, are motivated by the deontological principle of respect
for persons.164 All the right-to-die cases, the Patient Self-Determination Act,
and most of the legislation about advance directives fall into this category. 65
Alternatively, utilitarianism focuses on creating the greatest aggregate
good.166 Utilitarianism does not hesitate to balance the good of individual
160.

Fink, supra note 108, at 1.

161. TOM L BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
351 (5th ed. 2001) ('"The principle of autonomy,' [Kant] contends, is 'the sole principle
of morals,' and autonomy alone gives people respect, value, and proper motivation. A
person's dignity-indeed, 'sublimity'-comes from being morally autonomous.").
162. Id. at 69 ("[A]s with respect for prior wishes of the now-deceased, we are, except
in rare cases, obligated to respect the previously expressed autonomous wishes of the
now severely nonautonomous person because of our respect for the autonomy of the
person who made the decision.") (emphasis added).
163.

Id.

164.

Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1990).

165. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat.
1388, amendedby Patient Self- Determination Act of Dec. 1, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
104 Stat. 1388 (S) 4206, 1388 (1990). See also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
166.

Julia Driver,

The History of Utilitarianism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

PHILOSOPHY (Mar. 27, 2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/.
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patients against the overall good to be gained by society.' 67 When achieving
the good of a particular individual carries too great a cost for society as a
whole, principles of utility suggest that the individual should be denied the
right to further that individual good.168 Statutes that try to prevent the
wasting of medical resources by denying certain categories of patients the
right to those resources are a clear example of a utilitarian calculus.' 69 Laws
shifting futility determinations away from individuals to the medical
profession and laws that redefine death to limit the use of scarce lifesustaining resources to those who have a chance of regaining consciousness
are both examples of laws implemented to promote utilitarian principles.170
Additionally, policies that clearly shift medical attention away from
attempting to save the most seriously injured to harvesting organs are also
motivated by a utilitarian approach to resource allocation.
It is useful to keep in mind these two major approaches to ethics and the
tension between them when considering arguments for revising the
definition of death.
B. The Metaphysics ofDeath
Answering what death is and why it matters is complicated by religious
For some, death signifies an end; others, a
and cultural pluralism. 171
transition; still others, a return to the beginning. 17 Further complicating the
issue, death is fragmented by terms such as 'legal death,' 'cardiorespiratory
death,' 'brain death,' 'medical death,' and more. Even if society settles on

167.

Id.

168.

BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 161, at 347.

169. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1986) (limiting the obligation to medical screening and care
or transfer only in the case of"an emergency medical condition.").
170.

TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.052 (2003).

171.

H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT,

JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHIcs 26 (1986)

("Absent either a general conversion to one religion, or the existence of a generally
imposed orthodoxy, one will need to search for common grounds to bind rational
individuals in a peaceable community.").
172. Some believe "[d]eath is life's ending," yet, the relationship between death and
one's existence is controversial. While atheists generally understand death as the
annihilation of the self, many world religions (eg. Christianity, Islam, Buddhism) posit
that there is persistence beyond bodily death. Stephen Luper, Death, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (May 26, 2009), http://plato.stanford.edulentries/death/.
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the scientific criteria necessary for medical death, individuals may doubt the
sufficiency of medical death for religious or cultural purposes. 73
For anyone who does not believe in an afterlife, death is the dividing point
between existence and non-existence, and the reality or perception of when
that transition takes place is probably thought of in very concrete terms. 174
For some, it may be when all brain functions that allow interaction with the
world cease, while for others, it may be when higher brain functions
irreversibly cease or when the body no longer can interact with the world in
some fashion that is meaningful to that individual.175
For the various religions that view dying as a passageway to a new
existence beyond death, the consequences of changes in the definition of
death are varied. For example, Catholic tradition holds almost uniformly
that determinations of death are a scientific rather than a rel ious matter,
Metaphysical
but Jewish religious scholars are more divided on the issue.
concerns over when death occurs are not the main focus of this paper, but it
is very possible that such concerns further complicate the public's general
understanding of the organ retrieval process. Consider the clinical ethicist
who tells healthcare staff and families that waiting five minutes after the
cessation of circulatory function before declaring death, as is common
medical practice in accordance with IOM recommendations, is necessary so
While the
that the soul can leave the body before organ retrieval begins.
IOM never mentions the soul, it does mention that the five minute rule is
needed to allow emotional distance between therapeutic efforts and organ
retrieval.179 So when is the person dead - when death is declared or five
173.

Breitowitz, supranote 121.

174.

See Luper, supra note 172 (explaining the termination thesis).

175.

Id. at 1.2 (discussing the conflicting concepts ofanimalism and mindism).

176.

Education Programs: FAQ on 'Brain Death', NAT'L CATHOLIC BIOETHICS CTR.,

http://www.ncbcenter.orgfNetCommunity/Page.aspx?pid=436
2010).

(last

visited

Oct.

31,

177. Some leaders require the absence of breath and a heartbeat, others accept brain
death according to nuclide brain scans, still others require both cessation of
cardiorespiration and detectable electrical activity of the brain. Breitowitz, supra note
121.
178. The ethicist in question is a friend of Sigrid's who has an active clinical ethics
practice and teaches clinical ethics at a reputable program.
179.

INST. OF MED., NON-HEART-BEATING ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: PRACTICE AND

PROTOCOLS, 1, 17 (2000), availableat http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record-id=
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minutes later? In Part V., infra, we will explain how opting for a very
conservative approach to determining death and a very liberal approach to
allowing individuals to make end of life choices that include organ donation
can avoid such metaphysical problems.
C. The Dead Donor Rule
The dead donor rule is a generally unwritten, but almost universally
accepted, precept of organ donation-donors must be determined to be dead
before organ donation can proceed.1so The dead donor rule has its implicit
origins in the 1968 Harvard Medical School Ad Hoc Committee
recommendation that brain criteria be recognized as the legal standard for
determining death.' 8 ' It is also supported by the Catholic Church's Ethical
and Religious Directives.' 82
The rule is based in the deontological principle that it is wrong to expedite
a potential donor's death in order to save potential organ recipients. Robert
D. Truog, Professor of Medical Ethics at Harvard Medical School, and
Franklin G. Miller, a member of the senior faculty in the Department of
Bioethics, National Institutes of Health, argue that adherence to the dead

9700&page= 17 ("The recommendation of a five-minute interval between
cardiopulmonary arrest and the declaration of death is based on the acknowledged
limitations of [the empirical] data.").
180. Miller & Truog, supra note 52, at 674-75 ("At the dawn of organ transplantation,
the dead donor rule was accepted as an ethical premise that did not require reflection or
justification, presumably because it appeared to be necessary as a safeguard against the
unethical removal of vital organs from vulnerable patients.").
18 1. Norman Frost, Reconsideringthe Dead Donor Rule: Is it Important That Organ
Donors Be Dead?, 14 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS 249, 249 (2004), available at
http://muse.jhu.edu/joumals/kennedy institute of ethicsjoumal/v014/14.3fost.html
("Implicit in the report was the assumption that - for reasons of ethics, law, and public
acceptance - a patient should be dead before vital organs were removed.").
182.

William P. Fay, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care

Services, U.S.

CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS (4th ed. 2001), available at

http://www.usccb.org/bishops/directives.shtml (deciphering that "[t]he transplantation of
organs from living donors is morally permissible when such a donation won't sacrifice or
seriously impair any essential bodily function and the anticipated benefit to the recipient
is proportionate to the harm done to the donor" and "[s]uch organs should not be
removed until it has been medically determined that the patient has died.").
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donor rule has lead to definitions of death that cater to the rule.' 83 Instead of
merely protecting donors, the rule also paternalistically limited the
conditions under which patients can donate organs.184 The dead donor rule
faces three major criticisms: 1) that there is insufficient evidence that
patients have lost all brain function; 2) that the loss of brain function is not a
sufficient condition for death, rather the patient must also have lost
circulato 7 function; and 3) that death should not be a prerequisite for organ
donation.
On the other hand supporters of the rule argue that the dead donor rule
protects the wishes of the donors themselves.' 8 DuBois, who served on the
Institutes of Medicine 2006 Committee on Increasing Rates of Organ
Donation, points out that the rule has the great advantage that it does "not
invoke concepts that are dependent on any particular religious framework;
that it is consistent with and build upon the scientific evidence we have; and
that we simply must engage such issues if our laws are to have any moral
force and to inspire trust."' 7

V. SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTIES

Despite medicine's best efforts, pinpointing the biological moment of
death is elusive. It does not matter whether someone holds that either the
irreversible cessation of circulatory functions or the irreversible loss of brain
function is a sufficient or necessary condition for the determination of
death-both sets of criteria are fraught with medical uncertainty and fail to
shed much, if any, light on what really constitutes death.

183. Miller & Truog, supra note 52, at 674-75 ("[T]his ongoing reliance suggests that
the medical profession has been gerrymandering the definition of death to carefully
conform with conditions that are most favorable for transplantation.").
184.

Id.

185.

Frost, supra note 181, at 251.

186. James M. DuBois, Is Organ Procurement Causing the Death ofPatients? 18
ISSUES INLAW& MED. 21, 24 (2002), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/3527567.
187, Id.; see also James L. Bernat, A Defense of Whole-Brain Concept of Death, 28
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 14, 16-17 (1998). "As a matter of public policy, respecting the dead
donor rule is essential to maintaining public confidence in the medical profession's role
in organ procurement. Continuing to require the dead donor rule frees patients from the
fear that physicians will declare them dead prematurely for the purpose of procuring their
organs." Id. at 22.
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A. Accuracy of DeterminingDeath by CirculatoryCriteria
The permanent cessation of circulation and respiration is by far the oldest
and easiest method for determining that a person is dead. The presence of
so-called "vital functions" is the historic marker of life, and conversely, their
absence is the historic marker for death. Until recently, when a person's
heart stopped beating and chest stopped moving, there was little doubt that
the person was dead. Death was confirmed when the body became grey and
rigid. In today's world the criteria have not changed but there is less
willingness to wait for confirmation of death, because every minute that a
patient's/corpse's organs are without oxygen, the viability of organs
decreases.
Historically, little significance was placed on the causal relationship
between the permanent cessation of cardio-pulmonary function and the
irreversible cessation of all bodily functions.188 When a person's heart
stopped beating and/or his or her breathing stopped, it was impossible to
Not until the mid nineteenth century were there any
restart them.
techniques for artificial respiration (Dr. Silvester's method was introduced in
1858), and not until the mid twenty century did artificial respiration
combined with chest compression as it is in modem Cardiopulmonary
Resuscitation (CPR) become the preferred resuscitative practice.19 Methods
that make it possible to restart a person's heart beat or respiratory function
understandably seem miraculous and beg the question of how long does one
The most
try to restart these functions when they have stopped.'91
commonly accepted standard is still applied by emergency medical teams
when they come across a heart attack victim - at least thirty minutes if the

188. History of CPR, AM. HEART Ass'N, http://www.americanheart.org/presenter.
jhtml?identifier-3012990 (last visited Oct. 29, 2010).

189.

Id.

190. Not until the 1700s was mouth-to-mouth resuscitation officially recommended.
The 1900s brought about chest compressions, and finally the combination ofrespirations
and compressions.

Id.; see also Silvester's Method, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LONDON,

http://www.ucl.ac.uk/slade/slide/ShortStory/7b.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).
191. Know the Facts, Get the Stats: 2007, AM. HEART Ass'N (Dec. 2006),
http://www.americanheart.org/downloadabtelheart/1 16861545709855-1041 Know
TheFactsStats07 loRes.pdf ("In cities with 'community AED programs,' when
bystanders provide immediate CPR and the first shock is delivered within 3 to 5 minutes,
the reported survival rates from VF sudden cardiac arrest are as high as 48 to 74
percent.").
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patient is an adult and no physician is accessible to advise. 192 But there are
many factors that affect whether the patient's circulatory system will ever
regain function, such as age, the general health of the person, whether the
damage suffered due to illness or trauma can be repaired, and the length of
time the person has gone without a self-sustained heartbeat.193 The problem
is that all these and other variables interact to make it very difficult to come
up with a clear rule as to how soon it is appropriate to give up on trying to
save a patient and turn to salvaging organs for transplantation.194 The trick
is finding the point at which the person as an integrated organism is
irreversibly lost, but individual organs can still be restarted (even the heart)
in another patient.' 95 This becomes understandably difficult for the public to
grasp when people have determined death for centuries, if not millennia,
based on the irreversibleloss of heart function.' 96
Equally confusing is the debate over how long to wait to see if the heart
"auto-resuscitates" after efforts to save a person are stopped and organ
retrieval is begun.197 Simply put from a layman's perspective, if the heart
could auto-resuscitate there would be no need for artificial resuscitative
efforts in the first place. The whole point of emergency medical treatment is
that the patient needs medical support to survive and to have even a chance
at recovery. The common misconception is that emergency support will not
be withdrawn until it is clear that the patient is in fact dead, not just when the
medical team feels reasonably sure that the patient will die despite their best
efforts. 9 8 This perspective is not only a public misconception; it is also the
underlying premise in the emergency medical services protocol described
above. 99
192. CardiopulmonaryResuscitationProtocol, U.S. COAST GUARD, http://uscg.mil/
hr/cg I 2/docs/pdflSARCPRprotocols.pdf.
193.

AM. HEART Ass'N, supra note 191; U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 192.

194.

See Bemat, supra note 155.

195.

Id.

196. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 6, at 5 ("Traditionally, the cessation of
heartbeat and of breathing were regarded by the lay and medical communities alike as the
definitive signs of death.").
197.

Id.

198.

U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 192.

199.

Id.
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The modem medical standard for determining cardiac death for potential
organ donors is clearly convoluted. Imagine a person whose circulatory
system is so severely damaged that it cannot be repaired, for example,
someone who has uncontrolled bleeding in too many places to even try to
repair them all, yet that person's heart is still beating, albeit with the
assistance of resuscitative efforts, and although the patient is unconscious,
his brain is not damaged or not severely damaged. If resuscitative efforts are
stopped and the person's heart does not beat on its own, is that person dead
or only dying? Will that person be dead seventy-five seconds to five
minutes later, at the moment when his heart is removed and restarted in
another person? Does it make any difference if you know that neurologists
believe it takes approximately fifteen to twenty minutes of anoxia to the
brain to halt higher neurological function, even longer to cause total brain
Does the fact that the heart is virtually worthless for
death? 200
transplantation purposes if it is not removed within ten minutes after
oxygenation stops or that all major organs deteriorate rapidly if not
oxygenated by a beating heart change whether the person described above is
dead?201 There is no doubt that the standards for determining cardiac death
are evolving not because of new discoveries about the dying process, but
because of a desire to find ever more efficient ways to harvest the most
viable organs possible. The question is how should the law adapt to deal
with these changes?
B. Accuracy of Determining Death by Brain Criteria

Brain death, unlike cardiac or circulatory death, is being challenged
202
The use of brain death as a
because of new scientific discoveries2.
prerequisite for organ donation necessitates: 1) an acceptance that a
cessation of a certain neurological functions can be equated with death of the
person as a whole (a precept which has gained wide acceptance both in law
and in public opinion over the last fifty years); and 2) that our ability to test
for those functions is accurate (a precept which is increasingly challenged).
The science behind brain death remains insecure in its ability to directly
examine brain death/life, and medical experts are divided over whether brain
death can be generalized to death of the organism as a whole.203
200. James L. Bernat, Contemporary Controversies in the Definition of Death, 177
PROGRESS BRAIN RES. 21 (2009) [hereinafter Contemporary Controversies]; see also
Bernat, supra note 155.
201.

See Contemporary Controversies,supra note 200.

202.

PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 6.

203.

Id.
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The President's Council on Bioethics' 2008 White Paper on
"Controversies in the Determination of Death" raises questions about the
efficacy of the use of "brain death" criteria.204 Specifically, the report raises
the question of what, exactly, the term "brain death," used both colloquially
and medically, indicates; whether 'brain death' is, indeed, the death of the
human being;" and what to make of reports of patients with evidence of
ongoing integrated bodily activities (a requisite of the determination of death
cited earlier in the Council's paper) who meet criteria of "whole brain
death?" 205 None of these challenges are answered in the Council's report,
and evidence a need for further exploration into the meaning and use of
"brain death" criteria for the determination of death.206
The concept of "brain death" thus seems to be a convenient legal fiction
rather than a scientific fact. There is no other potential pool of organ donors
whose treatment is more obviously futile both from a personal and a public
perspective than brain dead patients. Yet, to decide that life without
significant brain function is not worth living is not the same as to say a
person whose brain is severely and irreparably damaged is dead. There is
life even with an irreversibly damaged brain; however, it is just not a life
most people feel is worth preserving, given the futility of further medical
intervention and the unlikelihood of meaningful recovery. 207 The notion of
"brain death" was not discovered, but was rather invented to allow
healthcare professionals to unilaterally remove such patients from lifesupport without fear of liability.

204.

Id.

205.

Id.

206. See Medical Subject Headings,NAT'L LIBRARY OF MED. (2009), http://www.nlm.
nih.gov/mesh/201 0/meshbrowser/MBrowser.html (search "persistent vegetative state"
and see information listed under heading "Scope Notes"). A permanent vegetative state
(PVS) "refers to the neurocognitive status of individuals with severe brain damage, in
whom physiologic functions (sleep-wake cycles, autonomic control, and breathing)
persist, but awareness (including all cognitive function and emotion) is abolished."
Additionally, functional MRI examinations have been utilized in "detecting covert signs
of residual cognitive function" in vegetative state patients. Id. See also Martin M. Monti
et al., Willful Modulation of Brain Activity in Disordersof Consciousness, 362 N. ENG. J.
MED. 579, 588 (2010). Also, "misdiagnosis of brain death is possible if a locked-in
syndrome, hypothermia, or drug intoxication is not recognized." Eelco F.M. Wijdicks,
The Diagnosis of Brain Death, 344 N. ENG. J. MED., 1215, 1218 (2001).
207.

J.L. Bernat et al., Report of a National Conference on Donation after Cardiac

Death, 6 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 281, 282 (2006).

2010
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What all these difficulties make evident is that death itself has not
changed only our willingness to declare people dead earlier in the dying
process, and the ultimate question is has doing so really benefited society
particularly given the growing trust crisis and the recent downward trend in
organ donation?
VL. INCONSISTENCIES IN LAW AND PRACTICE

One goal of the UDDA, which it has in common with all NCCUSL
documents, is an attempt to create uniformity in practices across state
lines.20 8 While the NCCUSL did succeed relatively well in creating a
209
the
semblance of uniformity in determination of death laws,
implementation of those laws, even those that seem similar in substance, is
far from uniform, and the policies of individual medical institutions are even
less consistent. A person who is legally dead according to the statute of one

208.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS, supra note 131.

209. Today, all states have established legal standards for determining death that
includes brain death criteria, but not all states have uniformly adopted the UDDA. Fortythree governing bodies (thirty-six states, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands) have determination of death acts almost identical to the UDDA. A Few
Facts About the Uniform DeterminationofDeath Act, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWs, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact factsheets/

uniformacts-fs-udda.asp (last visited Nov. 30, 2010). Three states have legal standards
for brain death determined through court precedent, which usually identify the UDDA
criteria as a nationally recognized standard even if the act itself is not cited. Arizona and
Washington both follow the UDDA and Massachusetts follows the UBDA. See, Arizona
v. Fierro, 603 P.2d 74, 74 (Ariz. 1979); Commonwealth v. Golston, 366 N.E. 2d 744, 744
(Mass. 1977); and In Re Bowman, 617 P.2d 731, 731 (Wash. 1980). Only Virginia
retains the language of the original Kansas law for determining death. VA. CODE ANN. §
54.1-2972 (2010). Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Texas use the Capron-Kass
standards. See HAw. REV. STAT.

§ 327C-1

(2010); IOWA CODE

§ 702.8

(2010); Ky. REv.

STAT. ANN. § 446.400 (LexisNexis 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (2010); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

§ 8.761.001

(West 2010). Florida, Illinois, and

Massachusetts maintain the UBDA criteria for determining death. FLA. STAT. §382.009
(2010); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/1-10 (2010); Golston, 366 N.E. 2d at 744. New Jersey
and New York follow the general verbiage of the Capron-Kass standard but includes
exemption from brain death based on religious beliefs. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6A-1 et
seq. (West 2010); Guidelinesfor DeterminingBrain Death, N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF
HEALTH (Dec. 2005), http://www.nyhealth.gov/professionals/doctors/guidelines/
determination_ of brain death/docs/determination of braindeath.pdf New York
requires each hospital to formulate written policies that specify the process for
determining brain death, using the Department of Health's manuscript as a guideline for
making the policy. Id.
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state is alive according to the statutes of another, and, even within a state, a
person found dead according to the policies of one medical institution might
be considered alive according to the policies of another.
A. Legal Inconsistencies

The UDDA so far has been adopted legislatively in 38 states and two U.S.
territories, and judicially in two additional states. o The ten states that have
not adopted the UDDA are Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Texas, and Virginia.211 Dissenting
states follow one of four alternative approaches: (1) the Uniform Brain
213
(3), the Kansas
Death Act (UBDA), 212 (2) the Capron-Kass Model,
214
model,
or (4) those that follow a model that creates a religious exception
to reliance on brain death criteria for determining death.215
It is worth noting that some of these statutes clearly express a mistrust of
216
the NCCUSL criteria for determining death.
For example, in Virginia,
210. See sources cited supra, note 209; see also DC CODE §7-601 (2010); V.I. CODE
ANN. tit. 19, § 869 (2010).

211.

Id.

212. Florida, Illinois, and Massachusetts follow the UBDA standard, wherein only the
standard of brain death is explicit and the traditional cardiorespiratory standard is
unwritten. See FLA. STAT. §382.009 (2010); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 50/1-10 (2010);
Golston, 366 N.E. 2d at 744.
213. Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Texas follow the Capron-Kass Model,
which provided a concise and clarified revision to the Kansas version. See HAW. REV.
STAT. § 327C-1 (2010); IOWA CODE § 702.8 (2010); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.400
(LexisNexis 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (2010); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

ANN. § 8.761.001 (West 2010).
214. Virginia follows the Kansas Model: the original, wordy and somewhat nebulous
text accused of creating a situation of two deaths. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (2010).
215. New Jersey and New York both allow for a person to not be declared dead based
on religious exemption. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6A-1 et seq. (West 2010); see also
Guidelinesfor DeterminingBrain Death, supra note 209.
216. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (West 2010) ("A person shall be medically and
legally dead if . . . there is the absence of spontaneous respiratory and spontaneous
cardiac functions and . . . attempts at resuscitation would not . . . be successful in

restoring spontaneous life-sustaining functions . . . [or] there is the absence of brain stem
reflexes, spontaneous brain functions and spontaneous respiratory functions.").
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circulatory criteria may only be relied upon if any attempt at CPR would not
restore such functions or if used in conjunction with brain criteria.2 17 In
Connecticut, the language used in its determination of death statute is
different than what is used in its anatomical donations statute, the former
using the UDDA standard, and the latter explicitly accepting only a brain
death determination of death, while allowing for "other method[s] of
determining death," without specif ing if those other methods are
Hawaii restricts the use of brain
circulatory criteria or something else.
criteria to cases involving organ donation or the cessation of artificial lifesustaining treatment, at all other times circulatory criteria suffice. 219 In
Illinois - for purposes of the Health Care Surrogate Act - death is defined
according to the UDDA, clearly applying circulatory and brain criteria in the
alternative, but elsewhere Illinois law identifies brain death as the only
acceptable means of determining death for organ and tissue donation. 220
Furthermore, note that various statutes describe the preponderance of
evidence for death differently: The Kansas model required that death be

217.

Id.

Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 19a-504a (West 2010), with CoNN. GEN.
§ 19a-279h(b) (West 2010). The language of the Determination of Death
Statute stipulates that for a qualifying hospital to determine whether to remove a patient
from life support there must be "either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and
respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain,
including the brain stem, is dead. Determination of death shall be made in accordance
with accepted medical standards." Whereas the Anatomical Donations Statute directs
that a donor be pronounced dead if "in accordance with . . . customary standards of
medical practice, the donor has suffered a total and irreversible cessation of all brain
function. A total and irreversible cessation of all brain function shall mean that the heart
and lungs . . . cannot function, and are not functioning, without artificial supportive
measures.").
218.

STAT. ANN

219. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327C-1 (LexisNexis 2010) ("The determination of
death in all other cases [non-donor cases] shall be made [based on cardio-respiratory
functions].").
220. Compare 755 ILL. COMP. STAT ANN. § 40/10 (West 2010) ("'Death' means
when, according to accepted medical standards, there is (i) an irreversible cessation of
circulatory and respiratory functions or (ii) an irreversible cessation of all functions of the
entire brain, including the brain stem."), with 755 ILL. COMP. STAT ANN. § 50/1-10 (West
2010) ('Death' means for the purposes of the Act, the irreversible cessation of total
brain function, according to usual and customary standards of medical practice.").
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"based on ordinary standards of medical practice," 22 1 which is what was
The ABA model uses "according
suggested by the Capron-Kass model.
to usual and customary standards of medical practice."223 The UBDA states
"made in accordance with reasonable medical standards." 224 The AMA
225 as does
prefers "made in accordance with accepted medical standards,"
226
the UDDA, and the forty states that follow the UDDA.26 Other states use
significantly different terminology. For example, Illinois uses "usual and
customary standards."22 7 Idaho law states "in accordance with accepted
medical standards which mean the usual and customary procedures of the
community in which the determination of death is made." 228 Idaho's
legislation acknowledges the nation-wide fact that there is no clear standard
in most areas; standards vary not only from state to state but also from
community to community. In reality, standards even vary from one medical
institution to another within the same community.
Finally, note that altering treatment plans for a hopelessly injured patient
can do just as much to expedite organ retrieval as declaring that patient dead.
It is possible, given current medical practices, independent of statutory
requirements, to cease curative efforts and prepare a patient for organ
221. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-101-09, 58-625 to 58-32 (2009) ("based on
ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence of sponta-neous brain
function; and if based on ordinary standards of medical practice, during reasonable
attempts to either maintain or restore spontaneous circulatory or respiratory function in
the absence of aforesaid brain function . . . "), with HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 327C-1
(LexisNexis 2010) (basing its determinations of death on "ordinary standards of current
medical practice").
222. See Alexander M. Capron & Leon R. Kass, A Statutory Definition for the
Standardsfor Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and A Proposal, 121 U. PA. L.
REV. 87, 111 (1972).
223.

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 6, at 64.

224.

Id. at 143.

225.

Unform DeterminationofDeath Act, supra note 144.

226.

Id. at 5.

As previously mentioned, "death" is defined twice in Illinois legislature. 755
ILL. COMP. STAT ANN. §§ 40/10, 50/1-10 (West 2010) (using both "accepted medical
standards" and "customary standards of medical practice").
227.

228.

IDAHO CODE ANN.

§ 54-1819 (2010).
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donation quite some time before a declaration of death. So it is possible, and
some believe even probable, that a patient's status as a potential organ donor
can influence pre-death treatment decisions independent of when it is legally
appropriate to declare the patient dead.
If legislators in Virginia,
Connecticut, Hawaii and Illinois intended to prevent premature
determinations of death for organ donors by requiring a determination of
death through the use of brain criteria, and not circulatory criteria, then that
intent can in many instances be thwarted by altering the end of life care of
potential organ donors to include preparation for organ retrieval prior to a
declaration of death. In other words, the significant moment for the
protection of dying patients is not the actual declaration of death, but the
point at which life-saving efforts cease and preparation for organ retrieval
begins. Legislators in Virginia and other states that rejected the UDDA
language may have found a way to help avoid the possibility that organ
donors are declared dead prematurely, but they have not prevented, if that
was their intention, the practice of treating donors as if they were dead well
in advance of an actual declaration of death.
B. Implementation Inconsistencies
Variations in legal standards beget inconsistencies in implementation.
Even with commonly shared statutes such as the UDDA, individual
institutional policies exhibit a wide range of troubling differences. Common
discrepancies include: when death is declared, what interventions are
initiated without consent, what procedures are allowed before death is
declared, and what is communicated to patients and families regarding the
organ retrieval process, particularly the preparations that take place before
the donor's death.
1. DeclaringDeath
Although state statutes mandate the basic criteria necessary for a
determination of death, implementation standards are left up to the medical
community. Unfortunately, there is considerable discord within the medical
community regarding both the specifics of declaring death and the
appropriateness of using certain procedures and practices in temporal
proximity to a declaration of death.
Marin County, California has a policy that allows emergency medical
service (EMS) workers to declare death.229 The policy states that a patient

229. Determination of Death in the Prehospital Setting: ALS Personnel,MARIN CNTY.
EMERGENCY MED. SERvs. 1(2001), http://www.co.marin.ca.us/depts/hh/main/ems/
documents/Policies/81 10.pdf. The Policy, in part, states:
Paramedics may not pronounce death, they may declare apparent death. [Patient
may be declared dead if] 1. Patient is in cardiac arrest (pulseless and non-
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discovered in a state of cardiac arrest AND not known to be alive in the
preceding fifteen minutes may be declared dead.230 The policy also allows
EMS workers to take into account social considerations such as
"resuscitative efforts are not wanted or appropriate, terminal disease, family
request, etc." in determining the appropriateness of non-action.231 By
contrast, the protocol provided by the United States Coast Guard provides
that unless the patient is obviously dead, or after ten minutes of CPR it is
determined that the patient has not revived and higher level medical care is
more than thirty minutes away and contact with a physician is impossible
232
and the patient is at least eighteen years of age, CPR must be continued.
Compare the above protocols to the "Brigham and Women's Hospital
Policy on Declaration of Death by Brain Criteria" which is consistent with
many hospital protocols. The procedure section begins with "An attending
physician must assume the responsibility for the determination and
declaration of death by brain criteria."233 In addition, the policy details that

breathing) 2. The patient was discovered in a state of cardiac arrest AND was
not known to be alive in the preceding fifteen (15) minutes. If Do Not
Resuscitate advance directive is present, witness to the arrest does not preclude
declaration of death 3. Asystole has been documented in two monitoring leads
for one (1) minute.

Id.
230.

Id.

231.

Id.

See U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 192, at 2. The Coast Guard noted that:
2. Obviously dead patients include those that are decapitated, incinerated, have
major organs (heart, lungs, brain or liver) separated, or for whom rigor mortis or
lividity is present.

232.

4. This is a SAR or MedEvac Mission, where higher level medical care is more
than 30 minutes away, contact with a physician is impossible and the patient is
18 years of age or older.
5. When patient is not obviously dead, CG EMS providers will start and
continue CPR until: Patient revives, EMS provider becomes physically
exhausted and cannot continue, EMS provider is relieved by another qualified
aid provider, death is determined by a physician, or aid provider directed to stop
by a physician.

Id.
233.

BRIGHAM & WOMEN'S Hosp. LEGAL STAFF, GUIDELINES FOR DECLARATION OF

DEATH BY BRAIN CRITERIA

(2004).

Death: A New Legal Perspective

2010

49

it is intended to "assist members of the medical staff in determining death by
brain criteria," and not "to replace physician judgment in individual
,234
Noteworthy differences include the focal responsibility of the
cases."
attending physician, as well as the focus on diagnosing and declaring brain
death without mention of social factors, such as those discussed in the Marin
County EMS policy.
Finally consider the "University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB)
Policies and Procedures" which state, on the one hand, "[d]eclare death after
2-5 minutes of no pulse, apneic and unresponsive to verbal stimuli," and, on
the other hand, allowing death to be declared two to five minutes after
"irreversible cessation of all spontaneous brain function," but gives no
indication as to how these two sets of criteria relate to the decision to stop
resuscitative efforts.235 Both these policy statements presuppose a valid
determination to give up on resuscitative efforts.
Allowing the exclusion of various types of brain activity is
counterintuitive to the UDDA's notion of "whole brain death", yet it is
common medical practice to exclude many different types of brain activity
from interfering with a declaration of death. The UTMB policy which
allows a determination of brain death on clinical observations alone, without
"confirmatory tests,"236 lists all of the following as not inconsistent with a
determination of brain death:

234.

Id.

235.

UNIV. OF TEXAS MED. BRANCH Hosr. ADMIN., INSTITUTIONAL HANDBOOK OF

OPERATING PROCEDURES (2007), availableat http://www.utmb.edu/ PoliciesAnd_

Procedures/Clinical/PNP_005024. Policy 9.15.9, provides:
(a) A person is dead when, according to ordinary standards of medical practice,
there is irreversible cessation of the person's spontaneous respiratory and
circulatory functions. (Patient is pulseless, apneic and unresponsive to verbal
stimuli for a period of at least 2 - 5 minutes).
(b) If artificial means of support preclude a determination that a person's
spontaneous respiratory and circulatory functions have ceased, the person is
dead when, in the announced opinion of a physician, according to ordinary
standards of medical practice, there is irreversible cessation of all spontaneous
brain function. Death occurs when the relevant functions cease.
(c) In cases of brain death, death must be pronounced before artificial means of
supporting a person's respiratory and circulatory functions are terminated.
Id.
236. See id. ("Conventional cerebral angiography, Electroencephalography,
Transcranial Doppler ultrasonography, Technetium-99m
hexamethylpropyleneamineoxime, (Tc-HMPAO) brain scan, Somatosensory evoked
potentials").
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* Spontaneous movements of the limbs not caused by pathologic
flexion or extension response.
* Respiratory-like movements characterized by shoulder elevation
and adduction, back arching, and intercostal expansion without
significant tidal volume.
* Sweating, blushing, and tachycardia.
* Normal blood pressure without pharmacologic support or sudden
increase in blood pressure.
* Absence of diabetes insipidus.
* The presence of deep tendon reflexes, triple flexion response, and
superficial abdominal reflexes.
* Babinski's reflex. 237
These are only a few examples of how confusing the standards for
determining death can be. The truth is that there are almost as many
variations in how declarations of death are made in and out of the hospital
setting as there are healthcare teams who make them.
2. Before Death

Keeping the care for the living patient and the recovery of organs separate
is crucial in avoiding real and perceived conflicts of interest, 238 yet for many
institutions it is difficult to maintain a clear separation.
The Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center-Shreveport, has
policies that aim to maintain separation between patient care and the
donation process, but nevertheless condones (albeit with reservations) the
insertion of an intravenous or arterial catheter before the patient dies.239 The

237.

Id.; but see Michael Cooperman, Diabetes Insipidus, EMEDICINE CLINICAL

(2009) ("Central diabetes insipidus is
characterized by decreased secretion of antidiuretic hormone (ADH) . . . ADH is
produced in the hypothalamus [which is located above the brain stem].").
KNOWLEDGE BASE, INSTITUTIONAL EDITION.

238.

AM. MED. Ass'N, OPINION 2.157 - ORGAN DONATION AFTER CARDIAC DEATH

(2005), availableat http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medicalethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion2157.shtml ("The health care professionals providing
care at the end of life should be distinct from those participating on the transplant team.
No member of the transplant team may have any role in the decision to withdraw life
support or in the process leading to pronouncement of death.").
239.

LA. STATE UNIV. HEALTH SCI. CTR., ORGAN DONATION AFTER CARDIAC DEATH

(DCD) PROTOCOL: LOUISIANA ORGAN PROCUREMENT AGENCY (LOPA), 1, 3 (2008),

http://www.sh.1suhsc.edu/policies/policy-manualsvia-ms-word/hospitalpolicy/h
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catheter insertion has no curative or palliative benefit - its only purpose is to
prepare the dying patient for post-death organ retrieval. What if the patient
is an organ donor but also has an advance directive that says he or she wants
to die peacefully without any invasive end of life measures?
The Arkansas Children's Hospital protocol allows the organ procurement
team to ask the clinical attending physician for changes in care to
accommodate organ donation before the declaration of death but informing
and getting consent from the family of the patient is required.240 Also, the
policy acknowledges the importance of comfort care, including a statement
that the sedation and analgesia usually used during the withdrawal of life
support may also be necessary when making preparations for organ retrieval
implying that such preparations may cause discomfort to donors.
St. Vincent Hospital provides a "Donor Maintenance" list of what should
be done post-donation consent, but before the withdrawal of life-support
takes place. The types of interventions that are allowed without specific
consent (all that is needed is consent to donate in general) include
performing blood draws, obtaining X-rays, and placing an arterial line.241
While the policy goes on to prohibit more invasive procedures such as cold
perfusion before a declaration of death, the policy also states that just before
removing life support measures, "[t]he ICU RN or physician will administer
Heparin 300 units/kg IV push," which is administered to help preserve the
donor's organs, without mentioning any need for consent for such a
procedure.
The literature on declaring death is replete with evidence of widespread
inconsistencies. One study conducted at the University of Utah School of
Medicine provides an extensive review of 105 institutional Donation after

.pdf ("Should the patient require the insertion of any intravenous and or arterial-line
catheters, necessary measures will be taken to minimize patient discomfort.").
240. ARK. CHILDREN'S Hosp., DONATION OF ORGANS AFTER CARDIAC DEATH K- 17, 1,
3 (Jan. 2009), http://www.pediatricethics.org/index.php?option=comdocman&task=
doc download&gid=7&ltemid= ("Care of the patient will continue .... as it would for
any patient on comfort care. Suggestions may be made by the ARORA staff regarding
medical therapies to improve organ function. The family must be informed (and consent

obtained), if additional therapies are used.").
241. ST. VINCENT INDIANAPOLIS HOSP., ST. VINCENT INDIANAPOLIS HOSPITAL:
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, ANATOMICAL GIFT AND DONATION AFTER CARDIAC DEATH,
(2009). See the section titled "Donor Maintenance" for a complete list of the attending
physician's responsibilities and tests performed once consent has been obtained. Id.
242.

Id.
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Cardiac Death Protocols (referred to at various times as "donation after
cardiac death," "non-heartbeating donation" and more recently and more
accurately "donation after the cessation of circulatory functions" policies),
finding that seventy-two percent of institutions have policies, and eightyfour percent of those policies specify criteria for determining death. 24 Of
the majority of hospitals (eighty-five percent) that expressly declare a
waiting period, ninety percent require five minutes from declaration of death
to the beginning of organ harvesting, with only four outliers (varying from
Antommaria and his
less than two and longer than five minutes).2
coauthors, however, also state that while some specified waiting period
between the determination of death and organ retrieval is common, "[m]ost
supporters of DCD do not require additional time for the donor to also fulfill
neurological criteria for death." 245
James L. Bemat, a well-published neurologist of Dartmouth-Hitchcock
Medical Center, reports that participants in a 2005 national conference on
DCD agreed with the Society of Critical Care Medicine that the wait time
from onset of asystole to declaration of death should be at least two minutes
and at most five minutes.246 Additionally, the article notes that some
procurement teams advocate requiring asystole of only "75 seconds on the
grounds that 60 seconds was the longest reported duration of asystole that
had been followed by autoresuscitation and that the sooner death can be
declared after asystole, the less damage from warm ischemia will occur in
the organs."247 Bernat is concerned about ever shortening wait times, but
more concerned about practices that ignore the intent of such waiting periods
by waiting for the actual retrieval but not waiting with the preparations
necessary for retrieval. In particular, Barnat is concerned by efforts to
improve organ perfusion following the removal of life-sustaining
treatment. 248 He found that "several hospitals" in his survey provided

243. Armand H. Matheny Antommaria et al., Policies on Donation After Cardiac
Death at Children's Hospitals: A Mixed-Methods Analysis of Variation, 301 JAMA
1902, 1903 (2009).
244.

Id.

245.

Id. at 1906.

246. James L. Bernat, The Boundaries of Organ Donation after Circulatory Death,
359 N. ENG. J. MED. 669, 671 (2008).
247.

Id.

248.

Id.
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Extracorporeal Membrane Oxygenation (ECMO) to the donor immediately
after death is declared. He states:
If ECMO adequately provided circulation and oxygenation of the
donor's entire body, it would retroactively negate the death
determination by preventing the loss of circulation and respiration
from becoming permanent and irreversible, potentially 'reanimating'
the heart and preventing the progression to brain destruction on which
the circulatory criterion of death is predicated.249
Further indicating the propensity to manipulate procedures to allow for the
declaration of death before total organ failure, Berat found that some
institutions favored the use of an ECMO combined with an intraaortic
occlusion balloon, used to block blood flow above the diaphragm
(preventing perfusion of the brain and thoracic organs) because it spares the
abdominal organs without perfusing the heart and brain, allowing those
organs critical to the determination of death (heart and brain) to deteriorate
while preserving other organs for transplant.250
Do such procedures undo the findings used for declaring death by
interfering with the otherwise inevitable progression to brain death? How do
these procedures affect the irreversibility requirement that is central to every
legal definition of death?
3. Before Consent

While some advocate a switch to presumed consent for organ donation,251
the current U.S. legal standard is that informed consent is required before
organ donation and pre-death preparations for donation.252 For this reason,
preparations taken before consent to donation violate the standard that
consent must be obtained. Even if a general consent to donation is obtained,
there certainly is no "informed" consent for the types of pre-death organ

249.

Id.

250.

Id.

251. See, e.g., Alberto Abadie & Sebastien Gay, The Impact of Presumed Consent
Legislation on Cadaveric Organ Donation: A Cross Country Study, 25 J. HEALTH ECoN.
599, 613 (2005); C. Cohen, The Case for Presumed Consent to Transplant Human
Organs After Death, 24 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2168, 2169 (1992); Veronica
English, Is Presumed Consent the Answer to Organ Shortages? Yes, 334 BRIT. MED. J.
1088, 1088 (2007).
252. OPINION 2.157, supra note 238 ("In cases of uncontrolled DCD, prior consent of
the decedent or consent of the decedent's surrogate decision maker is ethically required.
Perfusion without consent to organ donation violates requirements of informed consent
for medical procedures and is not permissible.").
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Such pre-death
preserving procedures discussed in the last section.
preparations clearly violate the legal disclosure requirement of informed
consent, but they also potentially can conflict with a patients express end of
life treatment preferences. It is also evident that the medical community is
well aware of these problems.
The AMA raised informed consent and disclosure concerns in its
discussion of the 1993 Regional Organ Bank of Illinois (ROBI) Protocol.
The AMA noted that perfusion was initiated before consent could be
obtained from surrogates, 253 and further that, at least in its first iteration, the
protocol allowed catheters to be inserted without consent and directed that
254
catheters be concealed from families under the bed sheets.
By way of contrast, consider the Beaumont Hospitals protocol, which
255
provides a comprehensive list of what informed consent must include.

253.

AM. MED. Ass'N, CEJA REPORT 3-1-94-ETHICAL ISSUES IN ORGAN

PROCUREMENT FOLLOWING CARDIAC DEATH: IN SITU PRESERVATION OF CADAVERIC

ORGANS, 1, 2 (1993), http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/369/ceja_3i94.pdf

("[W]hen the original design was implemented, none of the initial 35 surrogates
consented to perfusion . . . To enable a trial of in situ preservation, the protocol was
revised to allow the commencement of perfusion without consent of the decedent's
surrogate decision-maker.").
254. Id. at 3 (acknowledging that benefits of obtaining more organs for transplantation
outweigh the harm done by perfusion to the cadaver, since the patient has already been
declared dead and does not suffer harm. Due to the minimal level of intrusion and
discrete manner in which perfusion is performed, it was observed that most grieving
families were unable to identify that profusion occurred. As a result, "[n]one of the
families, even those who ultimately refused organ retrieval, objected when they learned
that perfusion had occurred without their consent.").
255.

BEAUMONT

AFFAIRS,

HOSPITALS INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEE (IEC) AND LEGAL
HOSPITALS: PATIENT CARE POLICIES--CORPORATE, ORGAN

BEAUMONT

DONATION FOLLOWING CARDIAC DEATH (DCD) (2009). The procedures for documenting

the surrogate's decision should be conducted as follows:
An explanation of DCD and the opportunity for donation.
An explanation of the medical and ethical rationale for DCD.
A clear statement that the surrogate is free to agree to or refuse donation.
An explanation of where and how support will be withdrawn and of the
measures used to maintain patient comfort.
A period of time for questions about the donor process.
A period of time for the surrogate to consider the decision.
An explanation of any additional procedures needed for DCD, including
premortem procedures that may not be for the benefit of the patient (e.g., use
of drugs, cannulation, bronchoscopy. liver biopsy, and other similar
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The protocol states that "[f]amilies should be permitted to consent to, or
refuse to consent to, the use of measures to restore circulation and
oxygenation to the organs of a candidate for DCD if cardiovascular arrest
occurs during testing." 256 This type of openness and respect for the
informed consent process, however, is more the exception than the rule
among the protocols we reviewed.
4. Disservice ofInformation
With all the inconsistencies in laws, professional standards, and
institutional policies, it is not surprising that the public is confused about the
relationship between declarations of death and the organ procurement
process. To make things worse, even healthcare professionals charged with
257
communicating about such issues at times lack clarity on these issues.
While there seems to be, in at least a few instances, a conscious effort to
258
or at least not fully disclose, the details of the organ procurement
conceal,
process, there also seems to be a profound lack of consistency in
communicating with the public on the interplay between determinations of
death and organ harvesting. The ROBI protocol discussed above, as
originally drafted, is an example where the consent process was intentionally
thwarted and evidence of organ retrieval preparations were intentionally
259
Other less severe transgressions involve the unintentional
concealed.
dissemination of potentially misleading information.
No doubt the Southwest Transplant Alliance meant to inform the public
when it created a brochure describing the organ donation process, but some

procedures), and their risks and complications and measures used to maintain
patient comfort.
Id. at 4.
256.

Id.

257. See Stuart Youngner et al., "Brain Death" and Organ Retrieval: A CrossSectional Survey of Knowledge and Concepts Among Health Professional, 261 JAMA
2205, 2209 (1989) (regarding the health professionals' confusion about the declaration of
death and its implications in organ transplantation); see also Laura A. Siminoff et al.,
Death and Organ Procurement:Public Beliefs and Attitudes, 59 Soc. SCI. & MED. 2324,
2326 (2004).
258. See CEJA REPORT 3 -I -94, supra note 253 (discussing ways medical teams may
mislead or conceal certain aspects of perfusion after the declaration of death but before
the decision by the decedent's family to donate).
259.

Id. at 2.

The Journalof ContemporaryHealth Law andPolicy Vol. XXVIL:1

56

of that brochure's content is confusing and potentially misleading. 260 The
brochure which divides the organ procurement process into chronological
steps, discusses how death is declared in its fifth step, but then in its sixth
step discusses providing medication for organ viability and comfort care.
Why would comfort care be needed after a patient is dead? Also, in one
place, the brochure tells patients and their families that donation does not
take place until after five minutes of asystole, but elsewhere the same
brochures states that donation takes place after two to five minutes of
asystole.261 Then immediately following a discussion of organ procurement,
the brochure state that "if the patient does not expire within one hour, the
medical staff transfers the patient to a location [...]," allowing for the

possible misconception that patients are expected to expire during the organ
procurement process.262 Far from catering to a fourth grade reading level,
the information provided requires extensive familiarity with the organ
procurement process to decipher what is meant. Such confusing statements
have the potential to unsettle family members, and are more likely to create
mistrust in the organ procurement system than to educate the public
effectively about the process.

260.

See SOUTHWEST TRANSPLANT ALLIANCE, ORGAN DONATION AFTER CARDIAC

SAVING MORE LIVES, http://www.organ.org/v2/assets/documents/brochures/
BrochureDonationAfterCardiacDeath.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2010).
DEATH:

261. Information provided by Southwest Transplant Alliance to potential donors and
recipients states:
During transfer to the OR, the donor is supported on a ventilator and monitored
by the surgical team and hospital staff. Once in the OR, medications are
administered for organ viability and comfort care. When the team is ready, the
donor is extubated. As in all settings where support is withdrawn, comfort
measures for the donor are of the utmost importance.
A hospital staff member declares cardiac death. The OPO surgical team waits
an additional two to five minutes to ensure the patient's heart does not start
beating again. Research has shown that a patient's heart will not start beating
again beyond two minutes after the declaration of cardiac death. After waiting
five minutes, the organ recovery begins. If the patient does not expire within
one hour, the medical staff transfers the patient to a location as outlined
according to hospital policy and the attending physician is contacted.
Id. at 6.
262.

Id.
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The most glaring lack of informed consent takes place where most people
263
sign up to be donors -- at their state department of motor vehicles (DMV).
Most DMV websites provide no information about the organ procurement
process, nor do they provide links to outside resources that might be able to
For example, a search on the
answer potential donors' questions.264
Wisconsin DMV site for the word 'organ,' brought up information on how
to register to be a donor, but non-active links to fact sheets about organ
donation itself.265 Even if DMV websites were more informative, most
people would probably appreciate having information available at the DMV
itself when they are asked to make the decision to donate, not through a
Consent given under such
computer at another time and place.
circumstances may be voluntary, but it is far from "informed."
VII. THE TRUST CRISIS

There is a well-documented crisis in the ublic's trust in all types of
Current organ procurement
authority, including healthcare professionals.
of this crisis. The
the
background
against
be
analyzed
to
need
policies
Health has a
Public
of
School
Harvard
the
that
enough
severe
is
problem
"Healthcare Trust Initiative" which recently published The Trust Crisis in
Healthcare: Causes, Consequences, and Cures,267 and has several ongoing

263. See generally Sandra Woien et al., Organ ProcurementOrganizationsInternet
Enrollmentfor Organ Donation:Abandoning Informed Consent, 7 BIoMED CENTRAL
MED. ETHICS 1, 7 (2006), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1764895/pdf/

1472-6939-7-14.pdf (discussing how the enrollment programs for organ donation do not
meet informed consent standards).
264.

See, e.g., Becoming an Organ Donor, Wis. DEP'T OF TRANSP., DEP'T OF MOTOR

VEHICLES, http://www.dot.wisconsin.gov/drivers/drivers/apply/donor.htm (last visited
Oct. 25, 2010).
265.

Organ Donor: Facts and Figures 2008, Wis. DEP'T OF TRANSP. 1 (2009)

http://www.dot. wisconsin.gov/drivers/docs/organdonor.pdf, Organ Donor Recipient
Discusses Issues To Being An Organ and Tissue Donor, Wis. DEP'T OF TRANSP.,

http://www.dot. wisconsin.gov/drivers/docs/audio-organdonation.doc (last visited Nov.
30, 2010).
266.

See generally DAVID A. SHORE, THE TRUST CRISIS IN HEALTHCARE: CAUSES,

CONSEOUENCES, AND CURES (2007).

267.

Id.
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projects dealing with how to help physicians regain the trust of their patients
and the general public.268
A. Trust in the Organ ProcurementSystem is Failing

The last half-century has brought significant advances in organ
transplantation, but it also has traded the personal relationship of general
practitioner and patient for a medical-industrial complex. 269 The impersonal
nature of modem medicine makes mistrust inevitable, especially among the
poor and minorities where such lack of trust is far from unfounded. 270 The
situation is aggravated by constant reminders that healthcare costs are too
272
271
high27 and that the organ shortage is reaching desperate proportions, both
268.

Forces of Change: New Strategiesfor the Evolving Health Care Marketplace,
http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/ccpe/programs/Forces.
html (last visited Oct. 31, 2010).
HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH,

269.

See generally, Arnold S. Relman, The New Medical-IndustrialComplex, 303 N.

ENG. J. MED. 963 (1980); see also James W. Jones et al., Consultation or Corruption?

The Ethics of Signing on to the Medical-Industrial Complex, 43 J. VASCULAR SURGERY
192, 193 (2006).
270. Recent studies into the donation and transplantation practices by minorities in the
U.S. is vastly underrepresented, especially among the African-American community,
when compared with the Caucasian community. Comparing the 2000 Census report and
data from the UNOS, while the US population is roughly 75% white and 12% black,
about 38% of the patients on the kidney waiting list are white and 34% of them are black.
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION BY RACE AND HISPANIC OR LATINO ORIGIN (2001),

http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs/phc-tl/tables/tabOI.pdf This
illustrates the inordinate burden to find matched organs present on the African-American
minority community. Furthermore, disparities in use of renal transplantation as treatment
for ESRD are exacerbated between whites and blacks, considering 30.9% of whites for
whom dialysis would be sufficient were placed on the waiting list, and 29% of black
patients for whom transplantation was recommended were directed to continue dialysis.
Arnold M Epstein et al., Racial Disparitiesin Access to Renal TransplantationClinicallyAppropriate or Due to Underuse or Overuse?, 343 N. ENG. J. MED. 1537, 1541
(2000). Finally, it has been shown that black patients are less likely to donate due to their
distrust of the medical system. L. Ebony Boulware et al., UnderstandingDisparitiesin
Donor Behavior: Race and Gender Differences in Willingness to Donate Blood and
Cadaveric Organs, 40 MED. CARE 85, 89 (2002). Due to this distrust, the result is fewer
organ donations to black patients in need. See generally Wayne B. Amason, Directed
Donation: The Relevance ofRace, 21 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 13, 13-19 (1991).

271. See e.g., Lesley Alderman, Doctors Offer Thoughts on Cutting High Health Care
Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/27/health/
27patient.html.
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of which can be perceived as motivating healthcare professionals to give up
on dying patients sooner than patients or their families would like.
In a recent article, James DuBois, who served on the Institutes of
Medicine 2006 Committee on Increasing Rates of Organ Donation,
discusses a finding that "25 percent or more of the members of groups
surveyed expressed fears that if they signed a donor card, then physicians
would do less to save their lives."2 13 One 2006 study reported in Critical
Care Medicine shows that healthcare workers have concerns that the need
for transplantable organs may cause a conflict of interest between the care
given dying ?atients and the care needed to preserve organs for
transplantation. 74 Numerous other articles and newspaper reports echo
similar concerns over the zeal with which organ procurement organizations
attempt to increase donations.2 75
Traditionally the courts have relied on the judgment of medical
professionals anytime death determinations were in question.276
But,
increasingly that reliance has come under scrutiny because of an ever
growing potential for conflicts of interest. Cost containment and organ
retrieval are potentially inconsistent with doing everything possible to save

272.

UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, www.unos.org (last visited Nov. 15,

2010). As of 7:20 am on Monday, November 15, 2010, there are 109,673 candidates on
the waiting list for an organ transplantation listed on UNOS' website. Id.

273. J.M. DuBois, Increasing Rates of Organ Donation: Exploring the Institute of
Medicine's Boldest Recommendation, 20 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 13, 19 (2009).
274. See Maxine Harrington, The Thin Flat Line: Redefining Who is Legally Dead in
Organ Donation after Cardiac Death, 86 DENv. U. L. REV. 335, 364 (2009) (discussing
the conflict of interest the medical profession is faced with when it is supposed to give
equal consideration to the patient in need of emergency room care and the potential organ

recipient).
275. See, e.g., Rob Stein, Project to get transplantorgansfrom ER patients raises
ethical questions, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2010, at Al; see generally David Crippen,
Donation After CardiacDeath: Should We Fearthe Reaper?, 36 CRITICAL CARE MED.
1363, 1363-1364 (2008); Rob Stein, New Zeal in Organ ProcurementRaises Fears.
Donation Groups Say They Walk a Fine Line, but Critics See Potentialfor Abuses,
WASH. PosT (Sept. 13, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2007/09/12/AR2007091202681 .html; Laura A. Siminoff et al., Racial Disparitiesin

Preferences and PerceptionsRegarding Organ Donation, 21 JGEN. INTERNAL MED. 995,
999-1000 (2006).
276.

See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (adopting the professional

judgment standard for determinations about the adequacy of care).
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the lives of patients dying of causes other than organ failure. Given that one
patient's demise can save or prolong the life of as many as nine patients
waiting for transplants, 2 77 the medical profession is faced with a dilemma the longer efforts are expended on saving a potential organ donor, the lower
the quality of that donor's organs for transplant. 2 7 8 This potential conflict
means both the courts and society at large can no longer see the medical
profession as an unbiased arbiter of the determination of death - thus as
financial concerns increase and the organ shortage worsens, the public's
suspicion of the medical profession inevitably increases as well.
The confusion, misinformation and lack of informed consent discussed in
this article understandably compound the trust issues created by potential
conflicts of interest. As mentioned above, studies show that a significant
portion of the public fears that being an organ donor might induce healthcare
professionals to discontinue emergency treatment earlier than otherwise
because of their interest in preserving organs for transplant.
It is also relevant to note that in 2009, for the first time in twenty years,
the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) reported that the rate of
voluntary organ donations decreased. This could be an indicator of just how
pervasive mistrust of the organ procurement system has become.279
B. How CurrentOrgan ProcurementPracticesAre Contributingto the Trust
Crisis

New medical developments have made retrieving
more efficient, in part through methods that require
care rather than just changes in how cadavers are
techniques are making the current legal definition
blurring the line between life-saving measures and
public trust in the transplant community is likely to

and preserving organs
changes in end of life
handled. These new
of death obsolete by
organ retrieval. And
continue to decline as

277. Donation in the News, LA. ORGAN PROCUREMENT AGENCY, http://www.lopa.org/,
(last visited Nov. 14, 2010) ("While one donor can save up to nine lives and enhance the
lives of over 50 people, there remains a critical shortage."). This number varies from
seven to nine depending in part on whether kidneys are considered life-saving. Patients
on dialysis can survive for years, but on average only live four years. A patient's survival
rate, particularly if a live donor can be found, is much higher, some claim. See SIGRID
FRY-REVERE, QUICK FACTS ABOUT KIDNEY DISEASE AND THE ORGAN SHORTAGE (2009),

http://ethical-solutions.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/1 0/Quick-Facts-Kidney-Diseaseand-the-Organ-Shortage2.pdf.
278.

Harrington, supra note 274, at 364.

279. Jim Warran, Living, DeceasedDonations Declinefor First Time, NEPHR ONLINE
(Apr. 28, 2009), http://www.nephronline.com/features.asp?F-ID=429.
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current legal standards fail to cope with changing organ procurement
practices.
1. The Information Gap and Informed Consent
The conceptual divide between what the average person intuitively thinks
of death and organ donation and the medical realities of both may give rise
to a sense that there is a concerted attempt by the medical community to
manipulate the public's end of life choices. While fears that organ donors
will be declared dead prematurely may be unfounded, the exuberance with
which organ procurement agencies and hysicians treat the prospect of new
donors only exacerbates the problem.
When perception and reality
conflict, the public may understandably get the impression that they are
being deceived in an attempt to collect more organs for transplant.
When individuals sign advance directives or talk to their relatives and
friends about end of life options, they probably do not consider how the
implementation of those wishes may be affected if they are a potential organ
donor.
Similarly, when people agree on their driver's license
applications/renewals to be an organ donor, can it honestly be said that they
are giving informed consent for what will be done to them both before and
after they are declared dead should they qualify as a donor? Do individuals
fully understand what they are agreeing to when they agree to be an organ
donor? 281
Healthcare professionals and researchers are also sensitive to the fact that
the general public is not aware of, and might be disturbed by, the
invasiveness of preparations for organ retrieval. The AMA's discussion of
the ROBI protocol mentions that researchers concealed the arterial catheter
inserted into the groin of the patient from the family with a bed sheet.282
This concealment may have been intended to prevent questions from the
family before efforts could be made to procure consent. Alternatively, the
researchers may have concealed the catheter to spare relatives and proxies
distress from seeing the tubing, although the AMA discussion states that

280.

See supra text accompanying note 275.

281. Some of these questions pertain to considerations that apply to the practice of
uncontrolled donations after cardiac death, which is a practice most potential donors may
not be aware of. See supra Part VI.B.2.
282. See CEJA REPORT 3-1-94, supra note 253 ("The perfusion catheter, which is
inserted in the groin, was hidden from view under a sheet and was not considered
disturbing by the families. None of the families, even those who ultimately refused organ
retrieval, objected when they learned that perfusion had occurred without their consent.").
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researchers found that families were not disturbed by the catheter once it
was revealed.283
While some of the procedures described in this Article may seem alien, if
not unintelligible, to some donors and their families, the problems caused by
lack of transparency are exacerbated by institutional inconsistencies.
Building on the IOM's 1997 discussion of the vast disparity in
transplantation protocols between hospitals, 284 Maxine Harrington, who is
Professor of health law, torts, medical malpractice, and bioethics at Texas
Wesleyan University School of Law, echoes what we have found in the
protocols we have collected: there is no doubt that different hospitals
pronounce death at different times for identical cases.285
In this climate, extreme caution is needed to prevent the perception that
physicians are establishing organ procurement policies to benefit certain
patients at the expense of others. Education and transparency may be a step
in the right direction, but more needs to be done to increase the supply of
organs without violating basic principles of respect for persons and without
risking diminished public trust in the transplant community.
2. Retrieving Organsfrom the Dying, But PotentiallyNot Dead Yet
Patient

Current practices in organ donation create a trust crisis by inadequately
delineating between the duty to preserve the life of a dying potential organ
donor and the duty to save the lives of potential organ recipients. In
particular, trends in donation after cardiac death are creating the perception
that organs are being retrieved from the dying, but not yet dead, patient.
a. From DCD to Brain Death andBack Again

"Donation after Cardiac Death," (DCD) at first called "Non-Heartbeating
Donation" and more recently and more accurately called "donation after the
cessation of circulatory functions," was the original protocol for cadaveric
287
When cadaveric transplants first became practical on a
organ retrieval.
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287. Murray performed the first kidney transplant between identical twins in 1954. A
Tribute to the Pioneersof Transplantation:Remarks by Dr. Murray at the U.S.
Transplant Games, NAT'L KIDNEY FoUND., http://www.kidney.org/recips/athletics/50yrs/
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larger scale in the 1960s because of the development of immunosuppressive
drugs, all organs that were not taken from live patients came from patients
who had recently been declared dead after a cessation of circulatory
function.288 Ischemia affecting the organs during the slow donor-to-donee
transition resulted, however, in low quality organs for transplantation. As
brain death criteria were written into law in many jurisdictions in the 1970s
and 80s, transplant teams shifted their focus from DCD to brain dead donors
because organs from brain dead donors could be retrieved immediately upon
289
If brain death
a declaration of death and thus were of higher quality.
criteria were met, organs could be retrieved regardless of whether circulatory
functions had stopped and thus before the organs suffered from oxygen
290
But
deprivation as they did in traditional DCD organ recovery situations.
nevertheless it is common practice to wait until after circulation has stopped
to harvest organs even from brain dead patients.
The common practice of waiting for a brain dead patient's circulatory
functions to stop before retrieving organs indicates uneasiness with sole
reliance on brain death criteria. In many, but not all, jurisdictions, it is legal
to begin organ retrieval immediately upon a declaration of brain death, yet in
every protocol we found, the transplant team has the option of starting
preparations for organ retrieval immediately upon declaration of brain death,
or even before, but may not actually remove organs until after the donors
circulation has stopped.2 91 The policy of waiting for a brain dead patient's
circulation to stop before harvesting organs indicates a willingness to risk
decreased organ viability for more certainty with respect to the

allograph was in 1959 and first cadaveric kidney transplant was in 1962. Joseph E
Murray: The FirstSuccessful Organ Transplantsin Man, OFFICIAL WEB SITE OF THE
NOBEL PRIZE (Nov. 1, 2010), http://nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/medicine/laureates/1990/
murray-lecture.html.
288. See CEJA REPORT 3-1-94, supra note 253, at I ("Prior to adoption of neurological
criteria for death in the . .. 1970s, the medical community defined death solely as the
cessation of cardiopulmonary function. Organs for transplantation had to be retrieved
and cooled quickly after death to minimize warm ischemia until the period between
circulatory arrest and commencement of cold storage.").
289. Id. ("The organs of these cadavers continued to receive an ample supply of
oxygenated blood through artificial support up until the actual moment of retrieval. This
minimized ischemic damage and generated better organ functioning in transplant
recipients.").
290.
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See Antommaria et al., supra note 243.
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determination of death of organ donors. Or perhaps it reflects acceptance of
the philosophical perspective that it is futile to treat brain dead patients and
that therefore it is acceptable to let them die, but not acceptable to retrieve
their organs until they are in fact dead.
As the organ shortage worsened dramatically in the early twenty-first
century and the transplant community continued to search for more efficient
ways to procure organs, the notion of returning to DCD gained popularity.292
Organs from DCD would be of better quality if death could be legitimately
declared sooner rather than the traditional conservative standard of waiting
at least five to ten minutes.293 Since all determinations of death statutes left
the exact timing used for DCD up to some variation of "medical standards,"
transplant teams began to push the limits on how early after the cessation of
circulatory functions organs could be harvested. With this shift came the
totally predictable debate over whether waiting ten minutes, five minutes,
two minutes or even a mere seventy-five seconds after circulatory failure
was enough time to ensure the patient was really dead.
So far, this Article has primarily focused on "controlled" DCD, but
"uncontrolled" DCD is even more controversial. Controlled DCD involves
situations where a decision has been made to discontinue life-sustaining
treatment and healthcare professionals can anticipate and control the dying
process. All organ retrieval from brain-dead donors are controlled DCD, but
so are cases where a patient is not brain dead but the family has decided
continuing treatment is futile. For example, controlled DCD can take place
when terminally ill patients are taken of life-support based on their own
wishes as expressed in an advance directive or through their surrogates.
Such situations involve a "controlled" donation after cardiac death because
the timing of the patient's death is somewhat predictable once life-support is
removed and the organ retrieval team can be ready and waiting to proceed
the moment death is declared. "Uncontrolled" DCD is different in that the
death is unanticipated. For example, uncontrolled DCD takes place when
patients suffer catastrophic events that cause their circulatory functions to
stop. For such patients, death comes after the medical team fails to stabilize

292.

See Peter L. Abt et al., Donation After Cardiac Death in the US: History and

Use, 203 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 208, 208 (2006).

293. Traditionally, death would be declared when the heart and lungs cease
functioning. Without motivation of organ preservation for donation, little if any literature
addresses a waiting time for the determination of death following onset of "surrogate"
symptoms until organ donation becomes keynote. N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE &
THE LAW, DONATION AFTER CARDIAC DEATH: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Apr.
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the patient and thus death is less predictable than with controlled DCD
where removal from life-support precipitates the cessation of circulatory
functions. In neither of these situations, controlled DCD (the specific
situation where the patient is not brain-dead but the patient or proxy makes a
quality of life decision) or uncontrolled DCD, is it practical to apply brain
death criteria for the determination of death because the use of brain death
criteria is more time-consuming than the use of circulatory criteria; so time
consuming, as a matter of fact, that the organs would be useless if
294
While
conventional methods for determining brain death were used.
determinations based solely on clinical observations of brain death are not
necessarily time consuming, they are not reliable early in the dying process,
and taking the time to confirm brain death through an electroencephalogram
(EEG), a cerebral blood flow (CBF) study, or other more technical means
can take hours.295 Thus, if there is going to be any chance of retrieving
viable organs from such patients (those for whom life-support is terminated
based on principles of self-determination and those who die despite
emergency care), healthcare professionals must rely on circulatory criteria
without any concern for whether brain criteria are met.
The NCCUSL probably did not have donation after cardiac death the way
it is practiced today in mind when it updated the Uniform Brain Death Act
with the Uniform Determination of Death Act.296 Before the 1970s, organs
retrieved after cardiac death were of very poor quality, in part, because of
the time it took to orchestrate organ retrieval - it took time to obtain consent
from families, to collect health information on the donor, and to notify and
assemble the organ procurement team.297 During the 1960s through 1980s,
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Abt et al., supra note 292.

295. Confirmatory tests such as angiography and radionuclide brain scans require an
injection of a dye into the blood stream thirty minutes to one hour in advance of the
testing. The Electroencephalography (EEG) requires the placement of electrodes on the
head and also usually requires at least an hour wait from set-up to results. The American
Academy of Neurologists recommends a session of"no electrical activity during at least
30 minutes" for an EEG confirming brain death, as well as a repeat six hours later of any
confirmatory test. See AM. ACADEMY OF NEUROLOGY, PRACTICE PARAMETERS:
DETERMINING BRAIN DEATH INADULTS 3 (1994), http://www.aan.com/globals/axon/

assets/4462.pdf.
296.

Harrington, supra note 274.

297. Dr. Murray spoke about having up to forty minutes after death to get a kidney
procurement organized:
On the evening of April 5, 1962, a 30-year-old male died in the hospital after
open heart surgery. He had been on a by-pass oxygenator at 20oC (68oF) during
this time and 3 hours prior to death had been hypotensive with little urinary
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the concern was not how soon organs could be harvested after death, but
rather how much time did the team have to organize transplant surgery
before the organs became useless. With improved communication between
hospitals and organ procurement agencies regarding potential donors, less of
a need to consult with family for permission to retrieve organs (because of
first person consent), and more efficient retrieval techniques, the focus
shifted from lessening the time between death and transplantation to
declaring death as soon as possible and doing as much as possible in
preparation for organ retrieval before death is even declared.
Current DCD practices are troubling to anyone who believes the cessation
of brain functions is integral to death because the sooner after circulatory
functions cease that organ retrieval begins, the more likel that the donor's
The American
brain is still functioning when the retrieval takes place.2
Heart Association states that "[b]rain death starts to occur four to six
minutes after someone experiences cardiac arrest if no CPR and
defibrillation occurs during that time."299 Estimates of how long after
circulatory functions cease brain death criteria are met vary drastically
depending on the overall condition of the patient and the severity of the
ischemia. If the onset of brain death only begins after four to eight minutes
of anoxia, 300 even a conservative ten-minute standard may be unacceptable
to someone who considers the total loss of brain function a necessary
condition for death. We have also heard people ask questions along the lines
of, "[i]f the patient is not brain dead, does he or she feel pain or have some
subconscious sense of what is going on?" The issue at hand, and one for
which this article seeks remedy, is not whether such concerns have medical
merit, but that it is not illogical for the public to ask such questions. The
information gap between the medical community and the public is
output. The left kidney was removed and placed in a refrigerator at 4oC
(39.2 0 F) within 40 min after death.
J.P. Merrill et al., Transplantationof Kidney from a Human Cadaver, 185 JAMA 347,
348 (1963).
298.

See ContemporaryControversies,supra note 200.

299. CPR Factsand Statistics, AM. HEART Ass'N, http://www.americanheart.org/
presenter.jhtml?identifier-3034352 (last updated May 8, 2008).
300. Therese S. Richmond, CerebralResuscitationAfter Global Brain Ischemia:
Linking Research to Practice,8 AM. Ass'N CRITICAL-CARE NURSES 171, 173 (May 1997),
availableat http://classic.aacn.org/AACN/jrnlci.nsf/0/a522e8311772eca 18825657600
782 1ab?OpenDocument ("A cascade of injurious events begins within minutes of
ischemia. Within 6 to 8 minutes, permanent neuronal injury and death occurs in the
central ischemic area.").
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disconcerting and needs to be addressed both for the sake of informed
consent and to begin rebuilding public trust in the organ procurement
system.
b. The IrreversibilityConundrum

Further complicating the debate are concerns over "irreversibility."o30 All
definitions of death include the requirement that the function used to
determine death be irreversibly lost. But, if the loss of circulatory function
must be irreversible, and the heart is an integral part of the determination of
circulatory function, how is it possible to retrieve a heart from a "dead"
patient and then restart it in another? Could not that same heart have been
restarted in its original owner? 302 And, even if the original owner's life
could not be saved, isn't the fact that the heart could be restarted in another
patient evidence that the donor wasn't dead when the heart was removed? If
the heart can be started in another patient, perhaps the medical team did not
try hard enough to restart the heart in its original owner or wait long enough
before declaring death. These types of questions may indicate a lack of
understanding of the medical status of such patients, but they nevertheless
are questions we can expect the public to ask. In the realm of public
perception, the scientific merit of such concerns is less important than how
they affect trust in the medical profession and the organ procurement
system.
Also, we are not convinced that perception is the only problem.
Educating the public will not solve anything if the medical community is
divided over what is appropriate. The irreversibility problem must be solved
before progress can be made either in presenting accurate information to the
public or in establishing clearer legal standards for the determination of
death. Within the context of organ retrieval, primarily three approaches to
when irreversibility may be assumed are common:
(1) When the patient's surrogate or family has decided to cease
medical interventions (including any resuscitation efforts). This
creates a situation where reversibility, even if possible, is against
public policy;
(2) When circulation cannot be restored even if resuscitative efforts
are initiated or continued, in other words, there is a clear case of
absolute medical futility;303 or

301. See Contemporary Controversies,supra note 200; see also Menikoff, supra note
150 (discussing the difficulties and uncertainties in determining irreversibility with
respect to cardiopulmonary function and organ donation).
302.

Harrington, supra note 274.

303.

See supra Part V.B. (discussing medical futility).
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(3) When the patient will not auto-resuscitate if nothing is done.
Option (1) leaves the decision up to patients and their surrogates and is
generally not controversial. The transplant community, in general, favors
option (3) and rejects option (2). Yet, the American Heart Association's
(AHA) resuscitation guidelines state all heart attack patients should be
resuscitated unless they have a DNR order (option (1) has been exercised),
there is evidence of rigor mortis (option (2)), or there is no physiological
benefit to be expected from CPR (option (2) again). 30 The AHA standard
only accepts options (1) and (2), but not option (3). The same can be said
definitively of the law in Oklahoma and Virginia. 30 Option (2) is also the
rule ado ted by several courts for death determinations in non-transplant
contexts.06 Much hinges on which of these three approaches for defining

304. AM. HEART Ass'N, ECC GUIDELINES PART 2: ETHicAL ASPECTS OF CPR AND ECC
(2000), availableat http://circ.ahajoumals.org/cgi/content/full/102/suppl_1/1-12. The
guidelines state, in relevant part:
Physicians are not obliged to provide such care when there is scientific and
social consensus that such treatment is ineffective. Some examples are CPR for
patients with signs of irreversible death, such as rigor mortis, decapitation,
dependent lividity, or decomposition. In addition, healthcare providers are not
obliged to provide CPR if no benefit from CPR and advanced cardiovascular
life support (ACLS) can be expected. For example, CPR would not restore
effective circulation in a patient whose cardiac arrest is terminal and occurs
despite optimal treatment for progressive septic or cardiogenic shock.

Id.
305. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 63.3101.3 (2006) ("'End-stage condition' means a
condition caused by injury, disease, or illness, which results in severe and permanent
deterioration indicated by incompetency and complete physical dependency for which, to
a reasonable degree of medical certainty, treatment of the irreversible condition would be
medically ineffective."); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (2009) ("[I]f the physician's
determination is contrary to the request of the patient, the patient's advance directive, the
decision of an agent ... or a Durable Do Not Resuscitate Order, the physician shall make
a reasonable effort to inform the patient or the patient's agent . . . of such
determination.").
306. The Michigan Court of Appeals discussed irreversibility in a case where a child
who had no heart-beat at the scene of an auto accident was later revived. The court held
that the fact that medical intervention was required to restore circulation did not mean the
child was dead before such resuscitative efforts proved effective. "Otherwise . . . the use
of the word 'irreversible' becomes meaningless." People v. Selwa, 543 N.W.2d 321,
322-23 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). The Idaho Court of Appeals gave a similar common
sense conclusion when it held that the fact that resuscitative efforts failed does not mean
the patient was dead before those efforts began. Quite the contrary, the patient died
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"irreversibility" becomes the legal standard. Option (1) arguably pushes the
limits of the dead donor rule but we argue should be incorporated into the
legal standard for determining death as a recognized exception to the general
obligation to treat. Option (2) is a common sense option unless increasing
the organ supply takes precedence over certainty in determinations of death.
Finally, option (3) is questionable because not only is there no consensus on
what that medical standard is, but there is evidence of ever growing mistrust
in the medical community's ability to set an unbiased standard.
To what extent will society tolerate the removal of organs from people we
are not certain are dead in order to meet the ever-growing need to procure
organs? How will the public react when it discovers preparation for organ
retrieval is taking place before a person is dead and possibly even before the
medical staff knows the patient or his or her family has consented to donate?
The lack of public information regarding the actual process of organ
donation is compounded by hospital secrecy. Several hospitals refused to
share their donor protocols with us, particularly when we asked for their
uncontrolled donation after cardiac death policies. Why would they not
want their protocols available for public scrutiny? One possible answer is
that they were concerned that their protocols would be misunderstood.
Another possibility is that they were worried about how the public would
react if they knew the realities of the organ procurement process. There
probably are many more possibilities for why hospitals did not want to share
their policies, including the possibility that the requested policies were in
flux, outdated or not being followed, but regardless of whether insidious
motives are involved, the lack of transparency on these issues logically leads
to public mistrust.
VIII. WHY PURSUING A DEFINITION OF DEATH THAT ENCOMPASSES MORE
POTENTIAL DONORS ISNOT THE RIGHT APPROACH

It would be easy to avoid most of the difficult questions of autonomy
encountered in this article if we could just find a definitive answer to the
exact moment of death. Science has repeatedly shattered cultural and social
perceptions of the world and perhaps it will do so again for death.
Unfortunately, our current scientific understanding of the dying process
despite such efforts and was only dead once such efforts were discontinued irreversibility only became a reality once efforts to resuscitate the patient ceased.
Jefferson v. E. Idaho Reg'I Med. Ctr., 883 P.2d 1084 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994). Finally, the
Connecticut Supreme Court in Finnegan v. Finnegan held that a person who has a heart
attack and then recovers with resuscitation efforts was not dead at any point during the
resuscitative efforts because clearly the stoppage of his heart was not irreversible.
Finnegan v. Finnegan, No. FA074031514, 2008 WL 642627 at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb.
19, 2008).
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seems to add to, rather than clear up, our confusion about death. In the
1970s and 1980s, there seemed to be a growing medical consensus that
"brain death" signaled death of the entire organism, but in recent years the
accuracy of techniques for determining brain death have come under
increased criticism, as have standards for determining how much and what
kinds of brain activity can be present in a "brain dead" person (as discussed
above). Similarly, techniques for finding a person dead under more
traditional circulatory criteria are also under scrutiny. There is considerable
scientific disagreement as to how long after the heart stops functioning a
person is dead.307 To complicate matters, there is also a growing concern
that brain death and circulatory death do not identify the same
phenomenon. 308 Dying is clearly a process, but death for legal purposes
needs to be an event identifiable by a specific instance in time - as a society
we need to choose a point in time regardless of our ability to accurately
identify such a point in time scientifically. All possible physical signs for
when life becomes death and their practical, social, and legal consequences
need to be evaluated thoroughly and a politically viable solution that both
engenders trust in the medical community and allows for a potential increase
in viable organs for transplant needs to be developed.
The inconsistent and at times contradictory nature of medical standards
and statutory policies contribute to public misunderstanding and mistrust.
Coming to a consensus, or legislating a new uniform standard, would help
prevent confusion, but whether or not it will also prevent mistrust depends
on how much of the public agrees with the definition. The more the public
believes that organs are being harvested from non-dead patients, the greater
the mistrust, regardless of how clear and precise the definition of death. If
the goal is to regain some of the trust in the transplant community that has
been lost due to the definition of death debate, the solution is to create a
clear and concise definition that defines death in such a way that most of the
public will agree that the donor in question is in fact dead. For example, a
definition that requires that both circulatory and brain criteria are met would
undoubtedly satisfy the vast majority of U.S. citizens. But such a policy
would also dramatically decrease the organ supply so it must be coupled
with an addition change in policy, such as the one described below.

307.

See Bemat, supra note 155.

308.

See Menikoff, supra note 150.
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IX. WHY ALLOWING MORE PATIENT AUTONOMY IS THE SOLUTION (A
GENTLER, MORE RESPECTFUL APPROACH)

Under current law patients can hasten death by requesting removal from
life support or otherwise refusing treatment, but cannot hasten death by
consenting to preparation for organ procurement or the actual harvesting of
organs before an official declaration of death even if their prognosis is
imminent death. It may seem macabre, but it is worth asking: If someone
can decide to let themselves die, or even actively kill themselves through
physician aid in dying, why can someone not decide to die in such a fashion
as to preserve as many organs as possible for donation? The key to
answering this question is not to be found in the definition of death but in the
determination of who has authority to make end of life care decisions.
A. The Honest Approach to Dealing With High Cost Life-Sustaining
Treatment
In most jurisdictions, a social consensus reached through legislative action
has decided that people who are brain dead are not worth keeping alive at
public expense, and can be a valuable source for organs because the organs
can be maintained in their natural environment (the body on life-support)
until they can be harvested. 309 The use of "brain death" to define death in
such cases is a legal fiction, designed precisely to prevent the wasting of
expensive medical resources and to allow the procurement of organs from
patients who may not be dead by everyone's standard, but who from a social
perspective, are not worth keeping alive. Brain death criteria clearly help
prevent futile treatment and legally protect physicians willing to harvest (and
patients and families willing to donate) organs from such hopeless cases.
This is not to deny that some (if not the great majority) of U.S. citizens
believe brain death indicates death of the entire person, but there is a
significant, and ever growing, number of Americans who question the
validity of brain death criteria as a reliable indicator of death. The solution
is to return to letting patients (and their proxies) decide the controversial
issue of when it is appropriate to harvest organs. The general legal standard
should be to err on the side of life, but there should also exist a safe harbor
from liability for those medical professionals willing to act in accordance
with clear and convincing evidence of a potential donor's personal attitudes
about death and the proper time frame for organ retrieval.

309. See Siminoff et al., supra note 257 (discussing a research study indicating
peoples implicit understanding and adherence to the paradigm of the dead donor rule,
which implicitly acknowledges the futility of maintaining a life through artificial support
and the worth of organ transplantation to the community-at-large).
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Some might criticize this approach, claiming it will increase healthcare
costs because more patients and families will demand that brain dead
patients be kept alive. But who pays for the upkeep of a "brain dead" or
otherwise heavily brain damaged patient is a separate question from whether
society should give individuals more latitude in how they personally define
death. This Article is not necessarily advocating this approach, but states
already have the authority to decide whether certain treatments are too
expensive to cover at public expense. Consider Hudson v. Children's
Hospital, the case where a Texas hospital refused to continue caring for a
thanatophoric dysplasia patient. 310 Under state law, the court found it was
permissible for the hospital to give the family ten days to transfer the patient
to another institution, and if the family did not do so, the hospital was within
its right to cease treatment. This is an instance where the citizens of Texas,
through their legislature, decided that severely and irreversibly brain
damaged patients, like brain dead patients, should not be kept alive at public
expense. The law in question, which is part of the Texas Advance
Directives Act, speaks misleadingly in terms of "futility," 3 1 but the net
effect of such a law is that it codifies a utilitarian calculus that limits public
healthcare expenditures on hopeless cases. In Texas, anyone who would
want to be kept alive despite a determination under the Act that doing so
would be against public policy would need to take measures to secure
funding for such treatment in some way other than at public expense.
Perhaps, people who felt strongly about being kept alive under such
circumstances could work to create non-public emergency healthcare
funding through personal savings, charity contributions or some form of
specialized insurance that would help cover expenses should they find
themselves suffering from a condition considered "futile" under the Act.
Such state laws might possibly conflict with the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA), but that is an issue that needs to be addressed
elsewhere. In the meantime, let it suffice to say that at least such laws take a
more honest approach to cost containment than trying to define severely
brain damaged patients as dead.
B. The Respectful Approach to End of life Care Related to Organ Donation

The legal precedents set forth in right to die cases in the organ donation
context should be applied. The same focus on patient self-determination
could be used to increase the number and quality of organs without risking
further erosion of public trust. Public policy should err on the side of life,
310.

See Hudson v. Children's Hosp., 177 S.W. 3d 232, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

311.

TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.045 (West 2009).
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but individuals should be free to decide the following for themselves: 1)
when to forego further treatment; 2) when to allow end of life care to shift
focus from trying to save the dying individual to preserving organs for
transplantation; 3) when to permit the harvesting of organs in accordance
with the individual's personal definition of death; or, 4) when to allow the
individual to die by the removal of organs, rather than the removal of life3 12
sustaining treatment.
This is not to suggest that organ removal before death should become
standard practice any more than should physician aid in dying. This Article
is simply suggesting that individual preferences be respected, even if they
violate a generally accepted public understanding of death and proper end of
life care, just as the removal of any patient from life-sustaining treatment
who is not dead is allowed as an exception to the general public policy in
favor of preserving life if there is enough evidence that doing so is what the
patient would want. There clearly are some individuals (the medical
literature is replete with accounts3 13 ) who do not think it immoral, but rather
see it as an altruistic act, for an irreversibly dying patient (or his or her
proxy) to allow organ removal before an official determination of death. But
allowing such people to follow their moral conscience does not imply that
others should do the same any more than letting terminally ill Oregonians
who wish to do so to avail themselves of aid in dying obligates others to do
so.
Respect for professional autonomy is also important. There undoubtedly
will be physicians who consciously object to participating in preparation for
organ retrieval or organ procurement before death, and there should be no
obligation on their part to participate in such activities. On the other hand,
those physicians who, in the interest of saving the lives of potential organ
recipients, would be willing to respect a patient's decision (expressed

312. See CEJA REPORT 3-1-94, supra note 253. It is interesting to note that the AMA
states that consent is necessary if perfusion begins before death occurs. This is the only
ethical and legal way to proceed because if the patient is not dead yet, informed consent
is required for all non-emergency treatment intended to save the life of the patient.
Preparation of organ donation clearly does not fall into this exception, so preparing a
body for donation without the patient's consent, through an advance directive, or his or
her surrogate's permission is a battery for which healthcare providers and the hospital

could be criminally liable. Id.
313. See, e.g., Truog & Miller, supra note 52; see generally Robert M. Veatch,
Donating Hearts after Cardiac Death - Reversing the Irreversible, 359 N. ENG. J. MED.
672 (2008); see generally Michael Cook, Abolish Dead Donor Rule For Executions and
Euthanasia, Say Bioethicists, BioEDGE: BIOETHICs NEWS FROM AROUND THE WORLD

(Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.bioedge.org/index.php/bioethics/bioethics

article/8718/.
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through an advance directive or healthcare proxy) to proceed with donation
before an official determination of death, should be protected from liability
if they do so. The law should adapt to accommodate healthcare
professionals at both ends of the definition of death debate in the same way
it has evolved to accommodate healthcare professionals and patients at both
ends of the physician aid in dying debate, or less controversially, the debate
over the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration or the refusal of any other
form of life-sustaining treatment.
X. CONCLUSION

If medical resources were unlimited, and a dying patient's organs did not
deteriorate so quickly, families could be given as much time as they needed
to decide when efforts to sustain life should cease, and when the harvesting
of organs, if at all, should begin. In a world of limited resources and patients
who could be saved by the expeditious procuring of cadaver organs,
however, there is intense pressure to take authority away from patients and
their proxies and shift the locus of decision making to medical professionals.
But instead of reaching a public consensus on the point at which treatment
efforts become futile and organs should be harvested, the argument over the
line between life and death has become increasingly divisive. Aggravated
by inconsistent scientific evidence and a growing schism between what the
public believes and the realities of the organ procurement process, mistrust
in the transplant community is growing and, for the first time in twenty
years, the rate of organ donation in the Unites States is on the decline.
Ultimately, the social and legal battle over the definition of death is about
who should decide at what point in the dying process it is appropriate to
either discontinue emergency medical treatment or to begin the organ
procurement process (i.e., should the patient through an advance directive,
the patient's proxy, the patient's family, the medical profession, or state
legislatures decide?). Traditionally, the courts have deferred end of life care
decisions to patients and their surrogates, but legislatures, through the
adoption of various legal definitions of death, have given the medical
profession authority over the point when expensive medical resources like
ventilators can be withheld and when in the dying process organ
procurement may legally begin. In recent years, the medical profession has
been torn between its obligation to try everything to save the life of all
patients equally regardless of their affliction, and its obligation to preserve
scarce medical resources on the one hand and its ability to save those in need
of transplants on the other. The public trust placed in "medical standards"
has permitted medical professionals to drift into questionable territory with
respect to the criteria used for determining death. Almost dead, or certainto-die-soon, patients are excellent candidates for organ procurement, but
they are not dead. For medical teams to begin the organ retrieval process
before donors are dead creates public suspicion and mistrust as well as a
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potential for legal liability. It is time to reevaluate whether the medical
profession, beleaguered by real and perceived conflicts of interest, is the
appropriate guardian of the definition of death.
It is shortsighted policy to trade patients' trust for a convenient definition
of death. The entire medical community suffers when physicians bow to
political pressures to cut costs and harvest more organs at the expense of
patients in need of emergency care or life-sustaining treatment. Ultimately,
it is not the physician's role to make quality of life decisions. Yet quality of
life decisions are exactly what physicians are making when they rely on
subjective measures of futility to deny dying patients life-sustaining
treatment, or when they begin organ retrieval on patients whose hearts are
still beating or brains are still functioning. Yet, it is not these acts
themselves that disturb us as much as the fact that these things are done
subversively, under the guise of having medical expertise in determining
death. It is no wonder that trust in the medical profession, and the transplant
community in particular, is plummeting. It is noble and highly praiseworthy
when individuals decide to change their end of life care plans to prevent the
waste of scarce medical resources or to donate organs, but it borders on
authoritarianism when public policy allows physicians to make such
decisions without their patient's consent.
The answer is to follow the example of most court cases and legislation
dealing with life-saving or preserving treatment; namely, empower
individuals, but do not require them, to make choices that benefit society as
a whole. This Article's recommendation - particularly so long as medical
science cannot conclusively determine death or agree on the significance of
a brain death diagnosis - is that the power to determine what happens to
dying patients and their organs should rest with the patients themselves. In
the same way that allowing individuals more freedom to direct end of life
treatment has resulted in fewer people demanding very invasive and
expensive end of life care, similarly, we predict, allowing individuals more
freedom to determine the conditions for organ donation, will create an
atmosphere of trust and respect where more people will donate, and donate
earlier in the dying process.

